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CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA
By JorN A. KAZAiiAN::
Our legal system has long encountered difficulty in its attempts to recon-
cile group interests with the unitary concept of the civil suit; for absent
incorporation or the intervention of statute, only private individuals are
capable of suing and being sued. Associations not incorporated, can have no
independent legal personality, and consequently they may only avail them-
selves of the courts when each member brings his own separate law suit. In
practice however, considerations of cost and convenience usually preclude
this method of proceeding, and extended groups may find themselves without
recourse to the judicial process. It is within this context that the class action
assumes importance.1 By enabling one person to sue on behalf of a great
many others, a collective legal personality can be established; as in theory
everyone is made a party through representation.2
Although provisions for representative actions are included in the
remedial sections of such statutes as the Ontario Business Corporations Act,3
the device garners the most attention in its general character as part of the
rules of civil procedure. Of late, those class action rules have been the subject
of considerable amendment in both the United States4 and England, as well
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' Representative actions in Ontario are governed by R.75 of the Rules of Practice,
which states:
R.75: Where there are numerous persons having the same interest, one or more
may sue or be sued or may be authorized by the court to defend on
behalf of, or for the benefit of, all.
The rules in the other provinces are much the same, save for Quebec where no
similar procedure exists and Nova Scotia where Rule 5:09 has been recently enacted
to read much like the U.S. Federal Court Rule, set out, in part, at note 3 infra.
2 It should be noted that there can, of course, be defendant classes as well as
plaintiff classes, but it is only with the latter that the present work is concerned, for
different considerations arise with suits against a class, particularly where questions
of damages are involved. Insofar as possible, the present work attempts to focus upon
the plaintiff suit and the principles and issues related to it. For an account of the
problems encountered by defendant classes as well as plaintiff classes see D. J. Sher-
baniuk, Actions By and Against Trade Unions in Contract and Tort (1958), U. of
T. L. J. 151; Also J. F. Keeler, Contractual Actions for Damages Against Unincorpo-
rated Bodies (1971), 34 M.L.R. 615.
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3 R.S.O. 1970, c. 53, s. 99:
99. - (I) Subject to subsection 2, a shareholder of a corporation may maintain
an action in a representative capacity for himself and all other shareholders
of the corporation suing for and on behalf of the corporation to enforce
any right, duty or obligation owed to the corporation under this Act or
under any other statute or rule of law or equity that could be enforced by
the corporation itself, or to obtain damages for any breach of any such
right, duty or obligation.
(2) An action under subsection 1 shall not be commenced until the share-
holder has obtained an order of the court permitting the shareholder to
commence the action.
Technically speaking, these suits are considered derivative as being on behalf of
the corporation rather than representative of each individual interest. For an analysis
of the differences between these two kinds of actions, see the judgment of Morand, J.,
in Farnham v. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688; Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill, [1973] 2 O.R.
389 (Ont. H.Ct.). In the U.S.A., at the state level, the inclusion of class action pro-
cedures within a substantive statute is more common. For example see Article 93A,
ss. 9 of the Massachusetts General Laws 1971, which generally provides for class
damage suits by injured consumers.
4 The Americans amended F.R.C.P. 23 in 1966 and gave it a broader scope than
its predecessor. The wording of the Rule is far more detailed than our own, and is
here set out in part, in order that reference may be had to the factors which American
federal courts are directed to consider. F.R.C.P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of lawv or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
cient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings in-
cude: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
(VOL. 11, NO. 3
Business Records
as in Canada5 at the federal court level. Nevertheless, the preponderance of
representative litigation in this country is governed by the provincial codes
and with few exceptions. Their wording has not been signifigantly altered
within the last 100 years. Moreover, decisions made pursuant to those rules
suggest a lack of conceptual appreciation for the purpose and function of
representation. if one is to achieve an initial understanding in this area of
Civil Procedure, then it can best be gained from an examination of the Court
of Chancery's reasons for establishing the practice almost 300 years ago.
Admittedly, the cases from Equity may not have any proper modern applica-
tion6 but there are invaluable theoretical lessons to be learned through
analysis.
PART I-HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF ThE-
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION-
The General Equity Party Rule
In seventeenth century England, judicial authority was divided between
the Court of Chancery, which exercised an equitable jurisdiction,7 and the
Until 1965 the English Rule was almost identical to our own but in that year
0. 15, r. 12, of the Supreme Court Practice was enacted to read, in part, as follows:
12.- (1) Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings,
not being such proceedings as are mentioned in Rule 13, the proceedings
may be begun, and unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or
against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing
all except one or more of them.
(2) At any stage of proceedings under this Rule the Court may, on the
application of the plaintiff, and on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit,
appoint any one or more of the defendants or other persons as represent-
ing whom the defendants are sued to represent all, or all except one or
more, of those persons in the proceedings; and where, in exercise of the
power conferred by this paragraph, the Court appoints a person not named
as a defendant, it shall make an order under Rule 6 adding that person
as a defendant.
(3) A judgment or order given in proceedings under this Rule shall be
binding on all the persons as representing whom the plaintiffs sue, or as
the case may be, the defendants are sued, but shall not be enforced against
any person not a party to the proceedings except with the leave of the
Court.
At the Federal Court level in Canada, Rule 1711 of the General Rules and Orders
of the Federal Court of Canada was enacted in a form almost identical to the above
English Rule. Given the untested scope of that Court's jurisdiction it is conceivable
that class procedures might play a significant role in future determinations.
6 See text infra, at notes 74-77.
7 On the Equitable origins of the class suit see generally: J. Story, Comments on
Equity Pleadings (8th ed., Boston: 1870); F. Calvert, A Treatise upon the Law Respect-
ing Parties to Suits in Equity (London: 1837); Mitford (Redesdale), A Treatise on
the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery (5th ed., London: 1847); S. Stoljar,
The Representative Action: An Equitable Post Mortem (1956), 3 Univ. of Western
Australia L. Rev. 479.
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Common Law Courts which were concerned with entirely "legal" matters. 8
As the procedure in each court became conditioned by the nature of its
jurisdiction, significantly dissimilar methods were developed for the selection
of parties. The Common Law took a narrow stance in dispute settlement and
held that it was generally necessary and sufficient to join as parties only those
persons whose direct and immediate legal rights had been affected.9 In con-
trast, Equity sought a "more complete justice"10 and attempted to adjudicate
upon the rights of everyone having any interest in the dispute. As a result,
the Court of Chancery formulated a general party rule whereby:
.. all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject
matter of the suit, are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or as de-
fendants, however numerous they may be, so that there may be a complete
decree which shall bind them all. 11
This difficult doctrine of necessary parties still pervades some aspects of
modem practice, and the reasons for its application are as valid today as
they were many years ago.1 2 Essentially, Equity was seeking a final disposi-
tion of every issue which related to a given situation. The presence of all
interested parties allowed the Court to examine every facet of the dispute
and thereby ensure that no one was adversely affected by its decision with-
out first having had an opportunity to be heard. In this way, Chancery was
8 According to the unitary concept of the civil action, common law litigation was
considered to be solely a two party adversarial matter, save in those specific instances
where actual joinder could be implemented. As Calvert, supra, note 7 at 3, stated:
"In this respect, there is a manifest distinction between the practice of a Court
of Law and that of a Court of Equity. A Court of Law decides some one in-
dividual question, which is brought before it; a Court of Equity not merely makes
a decision to that extent, but also arranges all the rights, which the decision
immediately affects."
91n Chitty on Pleading (7th ed. London: 1844) at 3, the following is set out:
"The general rule is, that the action should be brought in the name of the party
whose legal right has been affected, (a) against the party who committed or
caused the injury, (b) or by or against his personal representative."
10 Calvert, supra, note 7 at 2. Also, Knight v. Knight (1734), 3 P. Wms. 331, 24
E.R. 1088; Richardson v. Hastings (1844), 7 Beav. 323, 49 E.R. 1089.
21 Story, supra, note 7 at ss. 72, p. 75. The author there notes that historically,
there appeared to have been several different formulations of the rule couched in vague
language which was not characteristic of such "very logical thinkers" as Lords Redesdale
and Eldon. He attempts at ss. 76 c to explain this by stating:
"The truth is that the general rule in relation to parties does not seem to be
founded on any positive and uniform principle; and therefore it does not admit
of being expounded by the application of any universal theorem as a test. It is a
rule founded partly in artificial reasoning, partly in considerations of convenience,
partly in the solicitude of the courts of Equity to suppress multifarious litigation,
and partly in the dictate of natural justice that the rights of persons ought not
to be affected in any suit without giving them an opportunity to defend them
...we express but a general truth in the application of the doctrine, which is
useful and valuable, indeed as a practical guide, but is still open to exceptions
and qualifications and limitations; the nature and extent and application of which
are not, and cannot, independently of judicial decision, be always clearly defined."
12The doctrine has been more fully developed in the United States. See Fleming,
James, Civil Procedure (Boston: 1965) at 413-41. For the present Canadian position,
see Williston and Rolls, The Law of Civil Procedure Vol. 1 (Toronto: 1970) at 241-45.
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able to protect itself from a multiplicity of litigation and from the injustice
and embarrassment of subsequent inconsistent determinations.
There were occasions, however, when a strict application of the general
rule worked hardship by preventing a valid group of litigants from asserting
their rights. As Equity would not proceed to a decree without the presence
of all interested parties, one person's inability or refusal to participate in an
action could thereby exclude all others from their remedy. In response to
this inequity, the Court of Chancery embarked upon a process of gradually
making exceptions or adjustments to its party joinder rules, in an attempt
to preserve the intent and purpose of those requirements, while escaping
from the rigours of their formality.13
Given the historical context of seventeenth and eighteenth century Eng-
land, serious economic and social problems might have resulted had some
relaxation not occurred. In the final years of feudalism, a forum was needed
for the resolution of disputes between tenants and lords or parsons and
parishioners, and clearly the Courts of Common Law, given their unitary
concept of the civil suit were inappropriate for such numbers. Had Equity's
approach to party selection remained inflexible, compliance with its require-
ments would have been so impracticable as to preclude relief; yet Chancery
adapted its practices to suit the social climate of the times and extended the
application of its procedures for multiple party claims. New pressures for
further relaxation began to mount during the eighteenth century. As England
entered the age of imperial expansion and industrial revolution, businessmen
collectivized and combined in extensive commercial undertakings, but the
modem limited liability company had yet to make its appearance. 14 As a
result, these commercial organizations lacked a separate legal personality and
Equity was petitioned to entertain the claims of extended groupings of busi-
nessmen. Ultimately it did so, through a series of adjustments which even-
tually coalesced into the representative or class action.
In the following cases, the reader may be struck by an apparent lack
of cohesion, for the decisions encompass extremely broad and diverse sets of
circumstances. Moreover the ad hoc approach to the determinations further
compounds the problem.15 There is, however, one principal unifying link and
that is Equity's attempt to fairly resolve substantive claims, without losing
sight of its procedural goals.
13 Story refers to this process as a series of "exceptions", but a more correct
terminology would seem to be "adjustments", or "qualifications". Although changes
occur in the formulation and application of the rule, the fundamental aims and pur-
poses are preserved and accordingly it seems inaccurate to speak of exceptions.
-4 Supra, note 7 and infra, note 38.
15 Calvert, supra, note 7 at 4, comments on this ad hocism in the following way:
"It must, however, be observed, that the object at which judges have aimed in
giving their judgments has been, to lay down the rule with sufficient accuracy for the
case immediately before them."
1973]
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The Early Feudal Cases
The earliest reported cases involving representational adjustments1 to
Equity's party joinder requirements first appear in the late seventeenth cen-
tury,lr where numerous feudal tenants and parishioners were permitted to
participate in litigations over commonly held general rights,' 8 despite the
absence of one or more necessary parties. In the first of these, Brown v.
Vermuden (1676), Brown, the Vicar of Worselworth, sought to enforce a
decree for tithes of lead ore which his predecessor had obtained against all
the miners of the parish.'9 Since he had not been named as one of the
defendants in the earlier action, Vermuden asserted that he should not be
bound. The Lord Chancellor, however, held that "[i]f the Defendant should
not be bound, Suits of this Nature, as in the case of Inclosures, Suit against
the Inhabitants for Suit to a Mill, and the like, would be infinite and impos-
sible to be ended".20 Vermuden could not be said to have been prejudiced
by this result, for his position, as it related to the parson, was substantially
the same as that of his fellow parishioners, and the duty to tithes, here arising
by special custom, was general and common to them all. In a similar vein,
the Vicar of Wirksworth obtained a decree a few years later in Brown v.
Booth which bound future as well as existing parishioners.
21
In the lord and tenant cases, the primary issue involved the resolution
of a general feudal right which was common to all tenants, such as the right
to grind corn at a mill, or a right of common pasturage.22 In Brown v.
Howard2 3 for example, a few tenants instituted an action against their lord
16Although a theoretical appreciation for representation is not expressed until
much later (Chancey v. May (1722)) the term is used here to distinguish this line of
adjustment from others occurring at the time which involved matters not relevant to
the present work.
1' Stoljar, supra, note 7 at 480 cites City of London v. Richmond (1701), 2 Vern.
421, 23 E.R. 370 as the first clear appearance of the representative idea, apparently
picking up the reasoning of Plumer, M. R., in Meux v. Maltby (1819), 2 Swanst. 277,
36 E.R. 621, but the earlier authorities such as Story and Calvert place the date well
back in the 17th century. References appear in Brown v. Vermuden (1676), 1 Chan.
Ca. 271 at 283, 22 E.R. 796 at 802, to earlier decisions which unfortunately do not
appear to have been reported.
18 In the 17th century, the phrase "general right" was used in the sense of a
proprietary right in which a number of people shared a communal interest. In the feudal
situation, one could assert its relevance, but the notion becomes extremely difficult to
apply in later circumstances. For an explanation of general rights, See Z. Chafee,
Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties (1931-32), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1297 at 1308-16 and
Calvert, supra, note 7 at 46-55.
19 Brown v. Vermuden, supra, note 18, at 802 E.R. The earlier action, between
the vicar and the other miners does not appear to have been reported.
20 Id., at 802 E.R. The reference here to suits involving mills and inclosures, indi-
cates that earlier "adjustments" had occurred, but these cases are not reported. The
reference to the Lord Chancellor most likely meant Lord Nottingham.
21 Brown v. Booth (1690), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 164, 121 E.R. 960. Also Rudge v.
Hopkins 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 170, 22 E.R. 145, where the parishioners brought suit against
a parson.
22 How v. The Tenants of Bromsgrove (1681), 1 Vera. 22, 23 E.R. 277.
23 (1701), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 104, 21 E.R. 960.
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seeking to determine the amount of taxes owing to the manor upon the death
of either the lord or a tenant. The Court in considering the propriety of a
suit brought in the absence of necessary parties, stated:
... and it was insisted upon, that there being but some of the Tenants Parties
to this Bill, the rest would not be bound by this Trial: but Ld. K. held they
would; and said he remembered the Case of Nether Wiersdale between Lord
Gerard and some few Tenants, and Lord Nottingham's Case in the Dutchy, con-
cerning the Customs of Daintree Manor . . . and said in these and a hundred
others, all were bound, though only a few Tenants Parties; else where there are
such Numbers, no Right could be done, if all must be Parties; for there would be
perpetual Abatements; and it is no Maintenance for all the Tenants to con-
tribute, for it is the Case of all; . .. 24
Those underlying considerations of practicality and convenience which had
motivated Lord Nottingham's relaxation of the party rule in the instance of
parishioners,25 here influenced the Lord Keeper Sir Nathan Wright and led
him to make a similar adjustment in the case of feudal lords and tenants.2 0
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Equity would no longer
adhere to its strict party requirements in situations where all of the four
following conditions were met: (1) The subject matter of dispute was a
general proprietary right in which all parties had a common interest: (2)
The parties were so numerous that actual joinder would have been imprac-
ticable: (3) There was a special relationship, or privity, between each group
member and the adversary: and, (4) There was privity inter se the members
of the group. 27
Qualifications (3) and (4) were abandoned by Lord Chancellor Hard-
wicke in The Mayor of York v. Pilkington,28 where the plaintiff sued to settle
the city's claim to an exclusive right of fishery in the River Ouse. He also
sought an accounting of the fish that had already been taken by the de-
fendants, who were the lords and occupiers of the adjacent riparian lands.
They maintained however, that no general right could be asserted against
them as they were distinct and separate parties whose titles were derived
24 d., at 960 E.R. The cases referred to involving Lords Nottingham and Gerard
do not appear to have been reported.25 Brown v. Vermuden, supra, note 17.
2 0 Although the principle that the rights of no man are to be decided in his absence
was as valid three hundred years ago, as it is today, little problem arose in binding miss-
ing parties in these situations. Technically, a decision is considered binding or res
judicata only as to those persons who participated in the suit in order that no-one's
interest or position would be adversely affected without having an opportunity of de-
fending himself. As the court would ensure that the interests of absent parties were
identical to those of present parties, no real prejudice could occur. The binding effect
of class decrees has been the cause of great debate and confusion in the United States
where the suit has been more developed and where the possibility of monetary awards
further complicates the issues. See generally, Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil ss. 1751 and the articles referred to therein.
2 7 Chafee, supra, note 18 at 1306 considers the privity thinking expressed in
qualifications (3) and (4) to be characteristic of the older Equity judges and quotes
Pound in The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) as attributing this reliance on privity
to the influence of feudal proprietary notions.
28 (1737), 1 Atk. 282-84, 26 E.R. 180.
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from several different sources, and further that there was not any privity
between the plaintiff and themselves. The Lord Chancellor found the suit
properly constituted and in considering the privity question, noted:
In this respect it does differ from cases that have been cited of lords and tenants,
parsons and parishioners, where there is one general right, and a privity between
the parties. But there are cases where bills of peace have been brought, though
there has been a general right claimed by the Plaintiff, yet no privity between
the plaintiffs and defendants, nor any general right on the part of the defendants,
and where many more might be concerned than those brought before the court
. . .; but because a great number of actions may be brought, the court suffers
such bills, though the defendants might make distinct defences, and though there
was no privity between them and the city.29
The Court thereby allowed a trial of the general right, namely, the exclusive
right of fishery in which all parties had a common interest. Once this com-
mon question was resolved, anyone could subsequently raise a separate de-
fence at common law and show why the decree should not be binding upon
him. In this way, Equity entertained representative claims where group mem-
bers had distinct rights in addition to those which made up their common
interest. 30
The Early Commercial Cases
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, representational adjustments
to the process of party selection materialized in other substantive areas of
Chancery practice. Their first appearance in the commercial setting was in
1701 with the decision of the Lord Keeper, Sir Nathan Wright, in City of
London v. Richmond.31 In that case, the city constructed a water pipe in the
district of Cheapside, and instead of charging water rates, the council opted
for a fixed annual return by leasing the entire enterprise to Houghton. He,
in turn assigned the lease to Richmond and three others in trust for the bene-
fit of nine hundred people who had purchased shares in the venture. The
project proved unprofitable. When the city sued Richmond and three other
trustees for arrears of rent, they raised as their defence the insufficiency of
parties, but the Lord Keeper overruled the objection, finding that "the as-
signees by dividing of it into so many shares, had made it impracticable to
have them all before the court".,2
20 Id., at 181 E.R. The mention of prior adjustments is obscure but the Lord
Chancellor could be referring to London v. Perkins 4 Bro. Par. Ca. 168, where the
City of London brought bills for duties and only called a few of the citizens who
dealt in the dutiable wares before the court. As the action was to only establish a gen-
cral right to the duties, it was held to be proper.
80 It is important to note at this point that a great number of these adjustments
arose in actions called Bills of Peace. In essence, a plaintiff could seek a final resolution
of a matter in Chancery where it appeared that he would necessarily have to par-
ticipate in several separate actions at Law. In Mayor of York v. Pilkington, the Bill of
Peace was brought to establish the exclusive right of fishery against the several tres-
passers. The relationship between Bills of Peace and representative procedures is ex-
tremely complicated and some maintain that the class action found its source in the
Bill of Peace. For the best analysis of their historical development see Z. Chafee, Bills
of Peace with Multiple Parties, supra, note 18.
31 (1701), 2 Vern. 421 E.R. 870.
32 Id., at 871 E.R.
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The same consideration arose several years later in Chancey v. May3
where the manager and treasurer of a partnership brought suit "in behalf of
themselves, and all other proprietors and partners", 34 against the former
treasurers and managers for an accounting of several suspected misapplica-
tions and embezzlements. The eight hundred partners were not all named as
parties but the suit was allowed on the following grounds:
1st, Because it was in behalf of themselves, and all others the proprietors of the
same undertaking, except the defendants, and so all the rest were in effect parties.
2ndly, Because it would be impracticable to make them all parties by name, and
there would be continual abatements by death and otherwise, and no coming at
justice if all were to be parties.35
The court supported its decision, by saying that all the rest were in effect
parties. Here we find the first clear recognition of the representative theory
which underlies the modem class suit. In the earlier cases, the Chancellors
spoke of a decree binding absent parties, or of a relaxation of the general
party rule, yet prior to Chancey v. May, the idea of representation had not
really been articulated. Significantly, the phrase "on behalf of themselves and
all others", after this case began to appear with greater frequency in both
pleadings and judgments. This should not be taken to imply the existence of
a fully established theory of representation by 1722, but rather should be
seen as a rudimentary framework for subsequent considerations of class
litigation.
From Lord Eldon to Statutory Codification
Following Chancey v. May, and throughout the remainder of the
eighteenth century, few noteworthy representative actions were reported. Those
that did arise failed to display any significant advances or alterations, except
perhaps, for changes in the nature of claims and claimants which they revealed.
Gone were the feudal lords and tenants and in their stead appeared such in-
stitutions of commerce as insurance companies, mining adventures and the
crews of privateers. Plaintiffs became classes of partners or creditors and the
most common remedy, the bill for an account. By the end of the century, the
complexities of the commercial situation had placed added strains upon the
legal system to entertain a broader range of group claims. In response to
these pressures, the law relating to representative actions was clarified and
expanded by Lord Eldon in a series of decisions from 1802 to 1809.36
The first of these cases Lloyd v. Loaring,37 involved a lodge of Free-
32 (1722), Prec. Chan. 592, 24 E.R. 265.
34 Id., at 265 E.R.
351 d., at 266 E.R.
36 Lord Eldon (1801-1827). In Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 at 10, Lord Mac-
naghten reviewed the representative suit precedents and stated that "it is impossible,
I think, to read such judgments as those delivered by Lord Eldon in Adair v. New
River Co. in 1805 and in Cockburn v. Thompson in 1809, without seeing that Lord
Eldon took as broad and liberal a view on this subject as anyone could desire". His
approach to the office of Lord Chancellor however, is generally regarded as being
characterized by conservatism and caution.
87 (1802), 6 Ves. Jun. 773, 31 E.R. 1302.
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masons and the theft of secret documents by a dissident member, Loaring. In
order to prevent the threatened destruction of the papers, the chief officers
brought suit on behalf of the lodge for an injunction. The defendant objected,
claiming that the plaintiffs could not sue as a group, for an unincorporated
association was not to be considered a legal entity. Lord Eldon agreed, main-
taining that it was "the absolute duty of courts of Justice not to permit
persons, not incorporated to affect to treat themselves as a corporation". 38
The plaintiffs were, however, granted an amendment to sue on behalf of
themselves and all other club members as individuals, save for the defendant
Loaring. As long as the claim was made by individuals in their collective
rather than group capacity, each would possess a common interest in the
documents and the problem of corporate appearance would not arise.
Three years later, in Adair v. The New River Company, 3 an individual
plaintiff, the assignee of the Crown's share of profits in a certain corporation,
brought an action for an account of moneys owing against the corporation
and some of its officers. The shares were held by many different people,
including the fluctuating memberships of some very complicated trusts, and
when the defendants objected to the insufficiency of parties, Lord Eldon had
the following to say:
The consideration is, very different, if it is necessary to decide this point, whether
it is possible to hold that the rule shall be applied to an extent, destroying the
very purpose, for which it was established: viz. that it shall prevail, where it is
actually impracticable to bring all parties, or where it is attended with incon-
venience, almost amounting to that, as well as where all can be brought without
inconvenience. It must depend upon the circumstances of each case: but upon
all the authorities for the purpose of getting a decree it is not necessary, to bring
all parties interested.40
Eventually, the case was defeated on its merits, but the Chancellor's concern
for convenience and his willingness to approach each case on its particular
circumstances reflected a growing atmosphere of flexibility.
The general trend of relaxation was continued in Sir W. Grant's Rolls
Court determination of Good v. Blewitt.41 The captain of a privateer filed a
bill against the vessel's owners, seeking an account and distribution of cap-
tures, but the defendants objected, claiming that the crew members should
have also been named as parties. The Master of the Rolls found the case to
be similar to Chancey v. May,42 and observed that "here too was there a
great number of persons associated together for the purposes of the adventure
under the agreement common to all."'43 He thought it impracticable to de-
mand the actual presence of all crew members, particularly where some
might be dead or away at sea. Accordingly, an amendment was allowed,
changing the style of cause to an action by the captain on behalf of himself
8S1d., at 1304 E.R. The corporate character awaited a somewhat delayed ap-
pearance, for as Stoljar, (supra, note 7 at 485-87) remarks, a real distinction had yet
to be made between partnerships and limited companies.
39 (1805), 11 Ves. Jun. 429, 32 E.R. 1153.
40 d., at 1159 E.R.
41 (1807), 13 Ves. Jun. 397, 33 E.R. 343.
42 Supra, note 33.
4
. Supra, note 41 at 345 E.R.
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and all others who had been on the ship and, in effect, the crewmen became
parties.
Perhaps Lord Eldon's most extensive analysis of representative proce-
dures appears in Cockburn v. Thompson,44 where several persons filed a bill
for an accounting on behalf of themselves and all other proprietors of a
voluntary association against their solicitor. The defendant's objection for
want of parties was dismissed, the Lord Chancellor holding, after a careful
and complete review of the authorities:
The strict rule is, that all persons, materially interested in the subject of the
suit, however numerous, ought to be parties: that there may be a complete
Decree between all parties, having material interests: but that, being a general
rule, established for the convenient administration of justice, must not be adhered
to in cases, to which consistently with practical convenience it is incapable of
application. 45
and further:
The principle being founded in convenience a departure from it has been said
to be justifiable, where necessary; and in all these cases the Court has not hesitated
to depart from it, with the view by original and subsequent arrangement to do
all that can be done for the purposes of justice; rather than hold, that no justice
shall subsist.. 46
Had Lord Eldon not departed from the general rule, the affairs of un-
incorporated organizations would have been beyond the law's protection. 47
Without representation the courts would not have been accessible to such
groups, and as a result their very existence might have been threatened by
uncontrolled internal lawlessness.
The flexible, expansive approach of the above decisions was continued
through to Meux v. Maltby48 (1818), but in a line of authority dealing with
the dissolution of unincorporated partnerships, the application of representa-
tive procedures began to fall prey to judicial conservatism. In these cases the
Court's focus began to move from factors of convenience to an examination
of the common interests among group members and the slightest evidence of
dissimilarity became sufficient grounds to deny the collective claim.49 Even-
44 (1809), 16 Ves. Jun. 321, 33 E.R. 1003.
45 Id., at 1006 E.R.
40 Id.
47 Although the Chancellor had earlier expressed his refusal to invest non-corpo-
rate entities with legal personality (supra, note 38), it is unlikely that he would have
totally undermined them for such a result would have been wholly disconsonant with
the policies of commercial expansion from which they developed. See however, note
49, infra.
48 (1818), 2 Swanst. 277, 36 E.R. 621, and see also Weale v. West Middlesex
Waterworks Co. (1820), Jac. & Walk. 358, 37 E.R. 412.
49 For a more complete analysis of these cases see Stoljar, supra, note 1 at 487 if;
and Calvert, supra, note 1 at 40 where the author stated that "Lord Eldon took alarm
at the conduct of companies of 1825, . .. he did all in his power to discourage the
formation of them, by establishing in the Court of Chancery very strict rules upon
their forms of proceedings". The Lord Chancellor expressed this change of heart in a
series of cases beginning with Davis v. Fish (1823), cited in You. 425, 159 E.R. 1059
and continuing through Van Sandau v. Moore (1826), 1 Russ. 331, 38 E.R. 171. His
attitude towards companies was not out of touch with the times, for in 1825, Parliament
repealed the Bubble Act by Geo. 4, c. 91.
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tually, both the extended partnerships and the procedural treatment which
they had attracted fell into disuse, their demise hastened by developments in
modern company legislation.50
The suits concerning dissolutions comprised only one area of repre-
sentative suit development and the restrictive treatment which they received
was not reflected in the other cases of the period.5 1 In a series of decisions
between 1836 and 1841 for example, Lord Cottenham insisted that pro-
cedures should reflect the demands of modem society. His views were best
enunciated in Taylor v. Salmon,52 a case involving corporate directors and
the execution of a lease, where in overruling an objection for want of parties,
the Lord Chancellor stated:
I have before taken occasion to observe (see Mare v. Malachy, I Mylne & Craig,
599) that I thought it the duty of this court to adapt its practice and course of
proceedings as far as possible to the existing state of society, and to apply itsjurisdiction to all those new cases which, from the progress daily making in the
affairs of men, must continually arise, and not, from too strict an adherence to
forms and rules established under very different circumstances, decline to ad-
minister justice and to enforce rights for which there is no other remedy.5 3
Three years later, using almost identical language in Walworth v. Holt,5 4 the
Lord Chancellor reiterated the position, and added that "this has always been
the principle of this Court, though not at all times sufficiently attended to".55
This flexible attitude continued until the Common Law Courts and the Court
of Chancery merged following the Supreme Court of Judicature Act in 1872,
and representative actions came to be governed by a codified rule of civil
procedure."6
The Requirements of Chancery's Representative Suit
In examining the evolution of the representative suit, it becomes clear
that by the middle of the nineteenth century, most if not all of the important
developments had taken place. Equity would generally permit such actions
where there was a group or class of individuals with collectively similar in-
terests, and factors of convenience rendered compliance with party joinder
requirements impracticable. Few attempts were made to suitably define con-
6o Beginning with The Joint Stock Companies Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 and con-
tinuing through a series of statutes which culminated in The Companies Act of 1862,
25 & 26 Viet. c. 89, the modem corporate form evolved and supplemented these
earlier, less sophisticated institutions.
51 See Long v. Yonge (1830), 2 Sim. 369, 57 E.R. 827; Evans v. Stokes (1836),
1 Keen 25, 48 E.R. 215, and also Small v. Atwood (1831), You. 407, 159 E.R. 1056
and Wahworth v. Holt (1841), 4 My. & Cr. 619, 41 E.R. 238, restricting the narrow
application to dissolution suits.
62 (1838), 4 My. & Cr. 137, 41 E.R. 53.
G3 Id., at 56 E.R.
54 (1841), 4 My. & Cr. 619, 41 E.R. 238.
55 Id., at 241 E.R.
GO Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66. Schedule A, s. 10, see
note 73 infra.
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venience, 57 but a great deal of attention was paid to methods of determining
the proper class composition, which by this time meant the discovery of a
common interest among group members,58 or the requirement that the relief
sought was "in its nature beneficial to aIl".59 Both of these phrases reflected
Chancery's underlying concern with the absent parties who would have been
bound by its decree. When the Court examined the individual interests and
found uniformity, no question of prejudice could arise for the represented
interests of absent parties would be the same as those advanced before the
Court by the representatives.
Sometimes, the requisite singularity of interest would have been pre-
viously established through reference to other laws. For example in ques-
tions involving personal estates, the general party rule would have required
the presence of all creditors and legatees were it not customarily sufficient
that only the administrator or executor appear.60 In a great number of other
cases however, the Court inquired into various aspects of class composition,
and difficulties arose where the constituent interests were derived from dif-
ferent sources, or where a competition for priority existed among class mem-
bers. In the latter situation, Equity refused the representation, for as Sir
Lancelot Shadwell said in Newton v. Egmont (1832):
Notwithstanding the inconveniences arising from numerous parties, there are some
cases in which they can not be dispensed with... In this case, where the ques-
tion is priority of charge, the very nature of the question makes it necessary that
all the creditors should be parties; it implies a contest with every other person
claiming an interest in the land.6 1
The question of the defendants' liability in these cases would be one in which
all were interested, but that common character was vitiated by the potential
57 If one examines the cases, the usual indicia of inconvenience appear to be the
likelihood of absence (see Good v. Blewitt, supra, note 41) and the existence of large
numbers. No case can be found, however, where a suit was refused on the grounds
of insufficient numbers, and apart from Lord Eldon's recollection in Lloyd v. Loaring
(supra, note 37) of a "case very familiar, in which the Court has allowed a very few
to represent the whole world", most numbers varied between the 38 of Bainbridge v.
Burton (1840), 2 Beav. 539, 48 E.R. 1290, and the 60,000 of Davis v. Fish (supra,
note 49).
58 See A.G. v. Heelis (1824), 2 Sim. & Stu. 67, 57 E.R. 270 at 274, where in
speaking of an action by some townsfolk to enjoin the collection of certain taxes, the
Vice Chancellor Sir John Leach stated:
"The object of the bill is to avoid the payment of the assessment in question, and
every individual assessed has in that respect one common interest."
59 In Gray v. Chaplin (1825), 2 Sim. & Stu. 267, 57 E.R. 348 at 350, Sir John
Leach stated:
"In order to enable a plaintiff to sue on behalf of himself and all others who
stand in the same relation with him to the subject of the suit, it must appear that
the relief sought by him is in its nature beneficial to all those whom he under-
takes to represent."
GOSpraggv. Binkes (1800), 5 Ves. Jun. 583, 31 E.R. 751. Calvert supra, note 7
at 22-25 notes that "the law has furnished representatives of the interest in question"
and remarks that similar situations occur in the case of bankruptcy and where the
Attorney General represents the public interest.
61 (1832), 5 Sim. 130, 58 E.R. 286 at 289.
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for conflict which could arise as class members sought to rank ahead of each
other.
2
Difficulties also arose when group members' interests were derived from
separate or different sources. This problem, however, did not materialize
in cases involving general proprietary rights, for the Court could consider the
central issues by referring to the property rather than the owners' origins of
title. In Warrick v. Queens College Oxford,63 for example, some freeholders
sued the college in a representative capacity to restrain an interference with
commonly held land. Lord Hatherly, in overlooking the different derivations
of title, held:
I take it that the view of this Court is, that all persons having a common right
which is invaded by a common enemy although they may have different rights
inter se, are entitled to join in attacking that common enemy in respect of that
common right.64
On the other hand where no proprietary right existed, then a different basis
for each constituent claim often constituted so serious a disparity of interest
as to invalidate representation. In Jones v. Garcia del Rio,6r Lord Eldon re-
fused an action on the above grounds, where creditors sued for the return
of money which they had been induced to lend by fraud. Each person's cause
of action originated from a separate agreement and therefore a separate
fraud. Accordingly, the interests were in effect, several rather than common.
This position was re-assessed some years later in Beeching v. Lloyd66 where
upon similar facts Vice Chancellor Kindersley allowed the victims of separate
but identical frauds to sue for an accounting, despite the fact that their rights
arose under different agreements. The rationale was proprietary - for the
money which the several plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to invest was
partly used to purchase an estate and therefore comprised a common fund
in which all had a common proprietary interest.6 7
432 This position was somewhat modified several years later in Aldrich v. Westbrook
(1842), 5 Beav. 188, 49 E.R. 549 and Skey v. Bennett (1843), 2 Younge & Coll. 597,
63 E.R. 181, where mortgagors were allowed to sue on behalf of themselves and other
creditors despite the fact they claimed a right of prior satisfaction out of the mortgaged
property.
03 (1871), L.R. 6 Ch. App. Cas. 716.
,
04 Id., at 726. See also Mayor of York v. Pilkington, supra, note 29 and Com-
missioner of Sewers v. Glasse (1871), L.R. 7 Ch. App. Cas. 456 where at 466 Sir W. M.
James, on facts not unlike Warrick, overruled similar objections that "although the
Defendants may possibly have several and distinct rights, the right put in issue by the
bill is one general right which all these persons are interested in disputing".
45 (1823), Tur. & R. 297, 37 E.R. 1113. Although the case is here included for
the purpose of example, it must be considered so coloured by circumstance as to be of
questionable value. Not only did some creditors actually express a willingness to abide
by the loan and not to sue, but Lord Eldon displayed great reticence in allowing the
"King's Judge" to become involved in a contract dispute with a country (the Peruvian
government) which the Sovereign did not recognize. See also note 49, supra.
00 (1855), 3 Drew. 227, 61 E.R. 890.
67 Beeching v. Lloyd was later used in a long line of Canadian authority to de-
velop the "fund concept" referred to by D. J. Sherbaniuk, supra, note 2 at 170-76.
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Where there was more than one clearly recognizable class of interests,
Equity sought to accommodate them rather than refuse the action for want
of commonality. As the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly stated in
Bromley v. Williams:
... if there be three or four classes who have separate and conflicting interests,
then you may select two or three from each class to represent that interest, in
the same way as if the whole class had been brought before the Courtcs
In this way several classes could appear in one action, representing different
interest groupings. Where only one class appeared as plaintiffs, and some
members had an interest inimical to the group, the Court would "make the
other persons who have conflicting interests, or some, on behalf of the rest
if numerous, Defendants".69
Before departing from Equity, mention should be made of the various
forms of relief which representative plaintiffs commonly sought. Although a
great many of the earlier suits involved declaratory judgments and injunc-
tions, the remedy most frequently sought was the bill for an accounting. As
damage actions arising out of contractual or tortious injuries belonged to the
Common Law and not Chancery, it was Equity's primary means of ordering
and supervising the distribution of money. Yet, in light of the modern prac-
tice in class money claims,70 surprisingly little attention was ever given to a
distinction between represented and individual claimants. In recalling the
privateer case of Good v. Blewitt,71 and the loan case of Beeching v. Lloyd72
one must be struck by the Courts readiness to employ the remedy of account
in situations of great administrative complexity.
In making a final assessment of representative suit requirements in the
Court of Chancery, one must continually keep in mind the liberal and flexible
attitude which characterized its application and development. A procedural
rule which managed at different times to encompass the affairs of feudal
tenants, ladies clubs, corporate shareholders, bankrupts, sailors, creditors, and
others had to be extremely adaptable to the exigencies of changing circum-
stance. In this respect the approach of the Chancellors is worthy of note, for it
is clear that in their application of a previously untested procedure, they con-
tinually sought a proper balance between the interests of fairness and
efficiency.
The Present Status of Equity's Representative Suit
When the two great branches of English law were fused by the Supreme
Court of Judicature Act in 1873, the following words were included in the
68 (1863), 32 Beav. 177, 55 E.R. 69 at 73.
69 Id., at 75 E.R.
70 See infra, note 174 ff.
71 Supra, note 41.
72 Supra, note 66.
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Schedule to the statute, and the procedure which had been devised and de-
veloped in the old Court of Chancery became codified:
s. 10 Where there are numerous parties having the same interest in one action,
one or more of such parties may sue or be sued or may be authorized by
the Court to defend in such action on behalf of or for the benefit of all
parties so interested. 73
Although the section appears to do no more than rephrase a few lines from
the Chancery cases which preceded it, there is mixed authority as to what
effect this codification was to have upon the prior interpretations of the gen-
eral equitable rule. The leading House of Lords' decision seemed to imply in
1901 that the effect would be minimal,74 but nine years later, Lord Justice
Fletcher Moulton in the English Court of Appeal decision of Markt & Co.
Ltd. v. The Knight Steamships Co. Ltd. took a different approach:
In extending it the rule also formulates it. It may or may not accurately express
the practice of the Court of Chancery at that date, but that is immaterial. It is
the language of the rule that must govern us now, and even if it could be shewn
[sic] that before the Judicature Act the Court of Chancery would have applied
the procedure in cases not within the language of the rule, that would not affect
the present practice in any branch of the Supreme Court.rs
This position does appear to be more consistent with the effect given to
codifications in other areas of the law,76 but there is recent evidence that
courts are coming to reassess the Markt decision, and more carefully examine
73 Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, Schedule, s. 10 declared
in force 1874. More commonly referred to as Order XVI. Rule 9 of Amendment of 38
& 39 Vict. c. 77. The wording of the English rule up until 1965 was substantially the
same as the present Ontario Rule 75, which was first enacted in 1881 as Rule 98 and
attained its present form in 1913. For the wording of R. 75, see, note 1 supra.
Ont. Rules 74 to 85 also involve representative procedures but deal with specific
situations such as the settlement of trusts (R. 79). Worthy of note is R. 84 which states:
In actions for the protection of property and in cases in the nature of waste, one
person may sue on behalf of himself and of all persons having the same interest.
74 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1, where Lord Macnaghten stated that
the rule relating to representative suits had hardly changed at all since the time of
Lord Eldon and was only meant to apply the practice of the Court Chancery to all
divisions of the High Court. Several years earlier in Wood v. McCarthy, [1893] 1 Q.B.
775, Wills, J., similarly remarked:
"But then it is contended on behalf of the defendants that Order 16, Rule 9 has
altered the practice. I do not think so. I think that rule was intended to make
the practice of the Court of Chancery applicable to all actions, and I feel sure
that there was no intention to narrow the beneficial doctrine which had pre-
viously prevailed."
For a statement by an Ontario court to a like effect see the opinion of Orde J.A.,
in A.E. Osler & Co. v. Solman (1926), 59 D.L.R. 368.
75 Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamships Co. Ltd. (1910), 11 Asp. 460, [1910]
2 K.B. 1021 at 1038. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams appears to come to a similar
conclusion at 1029 K.B.
7GThe leading case on the effect of statutory codification is Bank of England v.
Vagliano Bros., [1891] A.C. 107, where at 144, Lord Herschell commented on the Bills
of Exchange Act, 1882, by saying:
"I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the
statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations
derived from the previous state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how
the law previously stood ... "
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the equitable origins of the codified rule. This, of course, does not suggest
any attempt on the part of the judiciary to actually apply Chancery decisions
in modem cases. Rather, it indicates a preparedness to find in those decisions
a conceptual basis for the modem rule and, moreover, displays a readiness to
adopt in spirit the historically flexible and liberal approach of the
Chancellors. 77
PART II - THE MODERN CLASS ACTION-
The two leading cases on modem plaintiff class actions were decided in
England before the First World War, and until recently, the Canadian posi-
tion has remained relatively unchanged from that time. In the first of these
decisions, Bedford v. Ellis,78 the House of Lords liberally interpreted the
codified rule, in a manner much like the Court of Chancery, whereas the ap-
proach in Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamships Co. Ltd.79 was restrictive and
virtually stultified subsequent lines of development. By comparing these two
decisions and analyzing them in the light of later authorities one can better
comprehend the two major issues in class suit discussion, namely - class
composition and remedy selection.
The Bedford case centred around an Act passed by the English Par-
liament in 1828, which regulated the erection and location of vendors' stalls
in Covent Garden Market and granted preferential rights of user to certain
groups of produce growers.80 When the owner of the market, the Duke of
Bedford, interfered with these statutory space allocations and charged higher
rents than those set out in the schedule to the Act, a representative suit was
instituted on behalf of the producers for a declaration that the Duke's con-
duct violated the Act and for an injunction restraining any further trans-
gression. In addition, the named plaintiffs, in their personal capacity and not
as representatives sought an accounting of rent payments made during the
preceding six years. There was no evidence of any pre-existing relationship
among the growers, and in fact class members were virtual strangers to each
other. Furthermore none of the usual indicia of proper class composition
such as association membership or common property ownership were present,
77 For example, in John v. Rees, [1969] 2 All E.R. 274 at 280, Megarry, J., set
out Lord Macnaghten's analysis of the Chancery decisions in Bedford v. Ellis (see
supra, note 74) and commented at 283:
'This seems to make it plain that the rule is to be treated as being not a rigid
matter of principle but a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of
justice."
For a similar approach in Ontario, see the opinion of Jessup, J.A., in Farnham v.
Fingold et al., [1973] 2 O.R. 132 at 136, where after quoting Lindley LJ. in Taff Vale
Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426 at 443 as to
the flexibility of the rule, he states: "Rule 75 should be applied to particular cases to
produce an expeditious but just result."
78 Supra, note 74.
70Supra, note 75.
SO (1828), Act 9 George 4, C. cxiii.
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yet the House of Lords found that the requisite similarity of interest ought
to be derived from the Act and therefore allowed the action to proceed. s '
In Markt, the cause of action arose in 1904 when the Russian Navy
sank a cargo vessel for carrying contraband during the Russo-Japanese War.
The plaintiffs claimed to be the owners of non-contraband materials lost by
the sinking, and as compensation did not appear to be forthcoming from
the Russian Government, they sued the ship's owners for damages in con-
tract and tort, and in the alternative, for a declaration of liability.82 The writ
was issued on the very eve of the limitation period83 and was styled on be-
half of the plaintiff "and other owners of cargo lately laden on board the S.S.
Knight Commander".8 4 The conduct or grievance which gave rise to the suit
was in effect one single act injuring all shippers of goods, very much like
the Duke of Bedford's conduct affecting all Covent Market growers. The
source of the violated rights, however, was not in any way similar for each
shipper's cause of action depended on the individual contract he had made
with the vessel's owners and not upon one general statutory or customary
right. As there were forty-three separate bills of lading made out by different
shippers, some of whom had shipped contraband and others who had not,
the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs were a mere
collection of individuals rather than a properly composed class because the
sources of their interests were "personal" rather than "common". 5 The
majority felt that in such situations actual joinder was the more appropriate
course for the plaintiffs to take, and Lord Justice Vaughan Williams treated
joinder and representation as mutually exclusive, choosing here to broaden
the scope of the former.8 6
Buckley, L.J., in his dissenting opinion, was prepared, unlike the
majority,87 to permit an action for a declaration of liability, on the grounds
that it was a form of relief in which every shipper had a common interest.88
By relying on the pre-Judicature Act cases of Meux v. Maltby,89 Beeching
1 At the trial level Romer, J., acceded to the defendant's arguments concerning
class composition and followed Temperton v. Russell, [18931 1 Q.B. 435 (C.A.), in
requiring that class claims be based upon beneficial proprietary rights (see infra, note
107). The decision of Romer, J., is set out at [1899] 1 Ch. 494 at 503. The Court of
Appeal, however reversed the trial judge, the majority distinguishing Temperton v.
Russell and finding the proper class composition at [1899] 1 Ch. 494 at 510. Of par-
ticular interest is the opinion of Lindley, M.R., a learned Equity judge, who sum-
marized the development of representative suits and gave a most liberal interpretation
to the scope of their application.
82 The plaintiffs claimed that by their seeking a declaration on the issue of liability,
the quantum of damage or the issue of separate defences could be dealt with in sub-
sequent proceedings. In one sense, this was like the fishery case of Mayor of York v.
Pilkington (supra, note 28) where the issue of separate defences was left for subsequent
proceedings at law, while the general issue was decided. That case, in Equity however,
involved a general or customary right and not several contractual claims. A closer
analogy might be the case of creditors or bankrupts where the issue of indebtedness or
insolvency is decided initially and the method of distribution later.
83 As per Vaughan Williams, L.J., at [191012 K.B. 1030, "I do not believe that
recourse would have been had to any such form of action had it not been for difii-
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culties arising in respect of the Statute of Limitations if any other form of action had
been adopted." As the cause of action was about to be terminated by the expiration
of the limitation period, the plaintiffs issued their writ in a representative capacity
apparently hoping to keep alive the claims of all owners, as many of them were resi-
dent in other jurisdictions. The worst that could happen to Markt & Co. would be to
have their representation struck out, in which case they would have still preserved
their personal cause of action from the effect of the limitation.period.
8 4 Supra, note 75 at 1022 K.B.
85 The characterization of these contractual or tortious rights as "personal", was
to have a profound impact on the availability of damage remedies in class actions (see
text at note 174 inIra). The Court focussed on the source of each claimant's rights and
not on the event which simultaneously gave rise to so many causes of action. The
plaintiffs then tried to argue around the problem of privity by maintaining that the
separate contracts were in fact similar, but Fletcher Moulton, L.J., at [1910] 2 K.B.
1040, stated:
"The defendants have made separate contracts which may or may not be identical
in form with different persons. And that is all. To my mind, it is impossible to
say that mere identity of form of a contract or similarity in the circumstances
under which it has to be performed satisfies the language of r. 9. It is entirely
contrary to the spirit of our judicial procedure to allow one person to interfere
with another man's contract where he has no common interest. And to hold that
by any procedure a third person can create an estoppel in respect of a contract
to which he is not a party merely because he is desirous of litigating his own
rights under a contract similar in form, but having no relation whatever to the
subject-matter of the other contract, is in my opinion at variance with the whole
system of procedure and is certainly not within the language of r. 9."
86 Vaughan Williams, LJ., at [1910] 2 K.B. 1030 stated: "... and I do not think
that the Judicature Act Orders and Rules intended that r. 9 of Order XVI (repre-
sentative action) should be available whenever those on whose behalf the plaintiff
affected to sue could shew [sic] that the right to relief arose in respect of or arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative where, if such persons brought separate actions, any
common question of law or fact would arise such as to allow a joinder of plaintiffs
under Order XVI, r. 1."
See Ontario Rule 66 for the current requirements of actual joinder. Quare whether
the actual joinder of parties was available under these circumstances, for one could
assert that there was not one transaction or occurrence but 43 separate contracts and
therefore 43 separate transactions? See note 85 supra.
87 Per Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton at [1910] 2 K.B. 1042:
'To the best of my knowledge no declaration of this type has ever been made by
English Courts, and it appears to me to be contrary to their practice. They do
not permit a plain claim for damages to be split up by isolating out of it an
abstract proposition of this kind. Each plaintiff has to prove the whole of his
case."
88 At [1910] 2 K.B. 1047, His Lordship stated:
"In this case the purpose or object of each and all of the shippers was to con-
sign their goods by a vessel which should observe the duty of not shipping also
goods which were contraband of war - a duty which her owners owed to all
shippers alike. Cargo owners on a general ship are not partners, but they have
a common interest in the ship on which their goods are carried. In respect of
that interest they are in a position to claim relief which is common to all of
them. They can claim a declaration that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs
To enable the represented firms to recover the damages which upon the
footing of the declaration may be recoverable by them requires, no doubt, further
steps, such as are always necessary in a representative action to give to the repre-
sented parties the particular relief to which each is entitled in respect of the
common relief which is for the benefit of all."
89 Supra, note 48.
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v. Lloyd 0 and The Commissioners of Sewers v. Gellatly,91 he maintained
that the rule ought to be flexibly applied to suit the changing circumstances
of modern life, and through analogy with the cases of creditors, where repre-
sentative actions were allowed even though each right arose under a separate
contract, he attempted to dispell the "separate source" objections of the
majority.92
Class Composition
According to the language of the codified rule, the only major require-
ments for proper class composition are that the persons be numerous and
that the same interest exists among class members. The problem of numbers
is straightforward.93 Difficulty, however, arises, when one attempts to deter-
mine the scope and meaning of the phrase "same interest", and here the rule
itself is of no assistance for it fails to explain which aspects of a particular
group's interests are to be considered. 94 Is it sufficient for all to be equally
concerned in the result, or must the constituent interests also originate at the
same time? Must all be identically interested in the subject matter of the
litigation, or is a common interest in its object required as well? As the
answers to such questions are not contemplated by the wording of the rule,
courts have been left to interpret the nebulous and extremely general phrase
"same interest" without legislative direction. Reliance has been placed upon
0oSupra, note 66.
91 (1876), 3 Ch. D. 610.
02 As per Buckley, LJ., at 2 K.B. 1044:
"It is, of course, no objection to a representative action that the rights as between
each of the represented parties and the defendants arise under a separate con-
tract made by one party with the defendants to which no other of them is a party.
This is so in most if not in every representative action. When one creditor sues
on behalf of himself and all other creditors for administration, the debt of each
represented creditor arose of course under a contract to which no other of his
represented co-plaintiffs was a party. The question is not whether there are
numerous separate contracts".
In fairness to the views of the majority it could be argued, as set out earlier in
the work (see text at note 60 supra), that the creditors suits, like those of testators,
were unique in concerning classes already "defined by law". The creditors analogy can
be traced to a few lines of Lord Macnaghten's judgment in Bedford, but Buckley, LJ.,
in Markt treats it in a manner wholly pervasive of his decision. A similar analogy was
drawn by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Smart v. Livett, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 47.
On the whole, little consideration has been given to this approach and most subsequent
observers have failed to accord much consideration to Buckley LJ.'s dissenting opinion.
03 Relatively little attention has been given the question of numbers. See generally
the 1973 English Supreme Court Practice at 179 and the observations in Re Braybrook
(1916) W.N. 74, and Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver (1972) 29
D.L.R. (3d) 774 (S.C. of B.C.).
04 The phrase "same interest", like other vague statutory wordings such as "public
interest" or "public convenience and necessity" actually defies clear and specific mean-
ing. It originated as an Equitable jack-of-all trades, and its broad and general character
made it well suited for a court which preferred flexibility, yet once codified as a rule
of civil procedure, its indefinite character caused difficulty and invited arbitrary treat-
ment. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the English rules and those of
the Federal Court of Canada have been amended to become more comprehensive (see
note 5 supra) without anything being done to change, or elaborate upon the "same
interest" requirement of proper class composition.
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certain passages in Bedford and Markt, so often recited, and so uncritically
applied, that they have almost assumed a statutory force of their own. One
such excerpt can be traced to Lord Macnaghten's attempt to present an over-
view of the Chancery practice in Bedford, where he stated:
Given a common interest and a common grievance, a representative suit was in
order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff pro-
posed to represent.95
This passage, which appeared merely to set out the old representative suit
requirements of Equity, was relied upon in the Markt case by Fletcher
Moulton, L.J., who oddly enough considered it to be an "authoritative inter-
pretation"96 not of the Chancery practice but of the codified rule. It was fre-
quently referred to in both England and Canada during the early decades
of the twentieth century, and in 1954, when the English Court of Appeal, in
Smith v. Cardiff Corporation97 refused a class action, not specifically because
of a lack of common interest, but on the grounds that the plaintiffs were
not advancing a common grievance nor seeking relief which would benefit
all members of the class, Lord Macnaghten's historical three part analysis of
Chancery proceedings attained the status of a three part test of proper class
composition. In Smith v. Cardiff Corporation a large number of tenants
sought a declaration that a rental increase scheme of the defendant municipal
corporation was ultra vires the Housing Act of 1936. As the increase dis-
criminated against the more affluent tenants, but did not affect the poorer
ones (the richer in effect subsidizing them) a successful action would not
have benefitted all, but only some, of the plaintiff class members. For the
same reasons of inter-class disparity, a common grievance could not have
been found. Evershed, M.R., speaking for the majority, was fully aware
of the context in which Lord Macnaghten's words were initially used 98 yet
he nonetheless chose to employ them as if they were exhaustive requirements
of the law, when he remarked:
That latter sentence was spoken in fact of the old Chancery practice before Ord.
16, r. 9, came into operation. But I am content to take it... that the necessary
qualifications in that sentence are applicable here and must here be shown to be
satisfied. It must be shown first that all the members of the alleged class have a
common interest, that all have a common grievance, and that the relief is in
its nature beneficial to them all. 99
95 Supra, note 74 at 8.
96 Supra, note 75 at 1039 2 K.B.
9 7 Smith v. Cardiff Corporation, [1954] 1 Q.B. 210. For a more complete discussion
of this case see Stoljar, The Representative Action: The Modern Position (1957), 4
U. of West. Aust. Ann. L. Rev. 58 at 62-64, where the author noted that as the action
was amended to a single suit by the named plaintiffs in their personal capacity, the
issue would still be tried though, albeit not as a representative action.
98 Interestingly enough, Lord Macnaghten also made a more Iiinted statement at
[1901] A.C. 9: "There are plenty of other cases which shew [sic] that, in order to
justify a person suing in a representative capacity, it is quite enough that he has a
common interest with those whom he claims to represent". It would appear that His
Lordship never expected his three part historical explanation to become a test for class
composition under the codified rule although one could argue that on the basis of his
willingness to equate the requirements of the statute and Chancery, he did.
99 Supra, note 97 at 220-21.
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This approach appears to be growing in popularity, for within the last
few years Canadian courts in New Brunswick,100 British Columbia, 1 ' and
Ontario, 02 have employed this three, or in some cases, two part test as if
it were incorporated within their respective rules of civil procedure. The
position may be an unfortunate one, however, for it could give rise to too
many additional questions which could compound the present difficulties of
interpretation, rather than eliminate them. If, for instance, "same interest"
and "common interest" mean one and the same thing, as Equity would have
had us believe, how then does a court, absent the baldest of judicial legisla-
tion, find its authority to go beyond the words of the rule and inquire into
common grievances or examine whether everyone will benefit by the action?
If on the other hand, "same interest" and "common interest" are not identi-
cal; that is to say, if the three part test can somehow be considered as being
implicit within the words "same interest", then one runs contrary to the
historical weight of authority which most often was only concerned with
common interest. In addition, courts in jurisdictions such as Alberta, where
the rule is worded to read "common interest" rather than "same interest",
would then appear to require a different test of class composition than those
in Ontario. 10 3 A way out of this apparent dilemma would be through the
avoidance of strict literalism, but for the present purposes it is sufficient to
note the existing difficulties and then proceed to analyze class composition
using the three part test as a framework for the attempted clarification of an
extremely confused area of law. At any point in time, the failure to satisfy
one or more parts of this test may or may not have been sufficient to defeat
a class claim. All that can be said with reasonable certainty, is that there
are cases such as the above mentioned Smith v. Cardiff Corporation04 where
the absence of a common grievance, or the existence of a claim not beneficial
to all class members has been held to go to the essence of the requisite in-
terest and place the action outside the scope of the rule.
(i) Common Interest
Turning then to the first requirement, common interest, one finds that
the relevant interest is one which pertains to the object or purpose of the
action. As Ridell, J., stated in May v. Wheaton:
... the representation contemplated by Rule 75 is a representation of a class
"having the same interest": it has reference not to relationship, etc., but solely to
interest in the result of the action.105
10O Delong v. The New Brunswick Teachers' Federation (1970), 3 N.B.R. (2d)
149 (N.B.S.C.).
101Alden v. Gaglardi (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 380 (B.C.S.C.); Affd on other
grounds (1971), D.L.R. (3d) 355 (B.C.C.A.); (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 760 (S.C.C.).
102Farnhan v. Fingold, [1972] 3 O.R. 688 (H.C.); [1973] 2 O.R. 132 (C.A.).
103 Alberta Rules of Civil Procedure.
104Supra, note 97.
105 [1917] 41 O.L.R. 369 at 371. The case involved an attempt to set aside bequests
in a will, and as there were others besides the plaintiff who were next of kin and in a
position to take under the will, a representative action was ordered to ensure the
presence of all interests. For more recent expressions of this point see Drohan v.
Sangaino Co. Ltd., [1972] 3 O.R. 399 (H.C.); Shack v. Mathews Construction Co.
Ltd., [1962] O.R. 556 (C.A.).
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This position finds further support in the earlier judgment of Markt, where
Vaughan Williams, L.J., goes so far as to use "common interest" and "com-
mon purpose" interchangeably. 106
As for the subject matter of this concern, limitations are insignificant,
for after 1901 the requisite interest, no longer had to involve a beneficial
proprietary right, as Lindley, M.R., had thought in Temperton v. Russell.07
Lord Macnaghten, first in Bedford v. Ellis,08 and later in Taff Vale Railway
v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants,0 9 found such a requirement to
"be opposed to precedent" and not "in accordance with common sense"." 10
As Lord Shand stated:
There is no such word as "proprietary" in the rule, and no good reason in my
opinion for holding that word by implication to be a part of the rule.111
In fact, Lord Lindley, who was responsible for the position in Temperton v.
Russell, acknowledged that the "unfortunate observations" had been "happily
corrected" in Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants.112
Recently, however, the Ontario position with respect to the substance
of class claims has undergone an extremely peculiar twist. In Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society v. A.G. Canada,18 an unincorporated association of
Jehovah's Witnesses instituted a class action for a declaration that certain
Federal Orders in Council had abridged their freedom of religion. The At-
torney General succeeded in having the representation struck out on the
grounds that spiritual interests were not included within Rule 75. The Master,
in coming to this decision appeared unmindful of the fact that the first repre-
sentative actions involved parsons and parishioners in the Court of Chancery
for he stated:
... in every case where one or more persons have been authorized to sue for
the benefit of all having the same interest, the interest has been material or
financial, or has derived from a statute, regulation or order passed by a com-
petent authority. It is evident from the prayer in the statement of claim above
quoted that if the class of persons whom Percy Chapman seeks to represent in
10 6 Supra, note 75, where at 1030 K.B., His Lordship states ".... I see no common
right, or common purpose, in the case of these shippers who are not alleged to have
shipped to the same destinations", and further, at 1032: "In the present case, as I have
already said, I do not find the common interest or purpose".
107 Supra, note 81.
108 Supra, note 74.
109 Supra, note 77.
110 Supra, note 74 at 8.
M'Id., at 18.
112 Supra, note 77 at 443 A.C. The elimination of this requirement was confirmed
in Canada in Small v. Hyttenranch (1903), 6 O.L.R. 388 (Div. Ct.) and in Metallic
Roofing Co. v. Local Union 30 (1905), 9 O.L.R. 171 (C.A.). See however; Robinson
v. Adams (1924), 56 O.L.R. 217 (C.A.). For an American observation on Barrett v.
Harris (1921), 21 O.W.N. 293; (1922), 69 D.L.R. 503 (Ont. H.C.), an Ontario case
which canvassed these proprietary notions, see the Note at 36 Harv. L. Rev. 89.
113 [1945] O.W.N. 537.
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this action have any interest, it is a spiritual or religious interest, and not a ma-
terial or financial interest, and does not derive from any statute, regulation or
order.114
In principle, there can not be any reason for so restricting the subject matter
of the interest, and this case, like Temperton v. Russell, seems to invite an
allegation of being not "in accordance with common sense". Apart from this
one qualification, however there are no restrictions as to what may comprise
the subject matter of a particular interest.
The character of the requisite interest, or more specifically the question
of commonality has received a distorted and narrow interpretation. This
initially was not the case, for Lord Macnaghten had recommended that a
liberal construction be given to the question of commonality and in Bedford
he remarked:
In considering whether a representative action is maintainable, you have to con-
sider what is common to the class, not what differentiates the cases of individual
members." 5
Fletcher Moulton, L.J., however, was not of the same mind in Markt, and in
fact, he devoted the better part of his judgment to a consideration of the dif-
ferences which existed between class members' interests. In so doing, he at-
tached qualifications to the rule which had not previously existed and gave
''common interest" a meaning more akin to a notion of "communal interest".
Implicit in his judgment was the belief that there should be some relation-
ship, or bond, of shared rights, for he stated:
It may be that the claims are alike in nature, and that the litigation in respect
of them will have much in common. But they are in no way connected; there
is no common interest. 116
and later:
The proper domain of a representative action is where there are like rights
against a common fund, or where a class of people have a community of interest
in some subject matter.117
In a great many instances, this distinction is insignificant, for a test
which employs either "common interest" (in the sense of identical) or "com-
munal interest" (in the sense of shared) should, in a majority of situations,
achieve the same results. Nevertheless this is not always the case, nor is it
consistent with principle. In theory, the rule is worded to take into account,
1 4 Id., at 540. The decision was recently cited by Holland, J., in Judge v. Muslim
Society of Toronto Inc., [1973] 2 O.R. 45 (Ont. H.C.), as authority for the proposition
that "A religious interest is, by itself, not sufficient". The case involved two groups
who were disputing each others right to the control of the Jami Mosque in Toronto.
The plaintiffs sought an accounting of all receipts by the defendants "for the acquisition,
operation and support" of the mosque, plus a declaration that the defendants hold the
lands and building in trust for the congregation. The plaintiffs however were not mem-
bers of the society and the trial judge dismissed the action. The wording of the judg-
ment is somewhat ambiguous but it could be argued that one of the grounds of Holland,
J.'s holding was the question of spiritual interest.
1 5 Supra, note 74 at 7.
1iOSupra, note 75 at [1910] 2 K.B. 1021, at 1040.
11 Id.
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and avoid, the possibility of prejudice to absent parties, and to that end it
matters not whether a bond or relationship of shared or communal rights
exists between class members. A represented plaintiff can only be prejudiced
if his interests are not the same as those of his representative. Conversely,
where those interests are one and the same,118 there can be no prejudice, and
any question of relationship or "communality", as opposed to "commonality",
becomes irrelevant.
(ii) Common Grievance
In practice, very little judicial attention has been directed to the defini-
tion of common grievance, and no decision can be found where a class action
has been refused exclusively on this ground. In Markt where the three part
test for class composition received substantial attention, and in Smith v.
Cardiff Corporation"9 where it gained prominence, the bases of the decision
included the lack of a common grievance but also extended beyond it to
encompass the scope of beneficial relief. In one respect, the plain
meaning of common grievance seems to be notionally included within
one or both of these other two requirements. For example, the tenants
in Smith v. Cardiff Corporation couldn't fulfill the common grievance re-
quirement because the suit would benefit the affluent class members, but not
their poorer brethren. Similarly, in De Long v. The New Brunswick Teachers'
Federation,20 where some members of a teachers' organization sued to de-
clare invalid an application by the directorate for union certification, Dickson,
1. denied the representation because six thousand of the proposed class mem-
bers had signed a petition in direct opposition to the plaintiff's claim. As all
class members did not subscribe to the same side of the grievance, no com-
mon interest could be found.' 21
If the idea of common grievance therefore appears to be contained
within either of the other two requirements, why then should it here be set
out as part of the class composition test? Recently in such cases as Drohan v.
118In Preston v. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 (Ont. H.C.), Orde, J., at 179,
stated that same interest did not mean "merely a like or similar interest", and thought
that point "very clearly brought out" in Markt. Note however the words of Grant, J., in
Drohan v. Sangamo, supra, note 105 at 402, who, after citing the above decision, went
on to find that the class members had "a sufficient like interest as to permit action to
be brought in the manner provided by Rule 75".
119 Supra, note 97.
120 Supra, note 100.
121 It may be important at this point to notice a difference in language between
the various rules. Ord. XVI, r. 9 of the English Supreme Court Practice, at the time
of Markt and Smith v. Cardiff Corporation, and the New Brunswick rule in 1970 at
the time of Delong v. The New Brunswick Teachers' Federation, like the original
codification, spoke of "same interest in one cause or matter", unlike the Ontario rule
which has required merely the "same interest". It is suggested that reference to the
phrase "one cause or matter", while clearly directed to the singularity of a proceeding
might well have influenced courts in the establishment of the grievance requirement.
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Sangamo Co. Ltd.,' 22 Judge v. Muslim Society of Toronto, Inc.12 3 and Alden
v. Gaglardi,12 4 some Canadian courts have omitted any reference to the
common grievance question and have expounded a two part, as opposed to a
three part test. Yet, the grievance question is important, for in some instances
it can serve to crystallize principle and simplify inquiry into the propriety
of a given claim. This function becomes more readily apparent when one
examines the reasons for judicial caution in dealing with plaintiff class actions
- a caution expressed by Dickson, J., in DeLong v. New Brunswick Teach-
ers' Federation when he considered the rationale behind the grievance re-
quirement, and class composition qualifications in general, and stated:
It would quite obviously lead to the most gross abuse of the process of the
Courts if anyone wishing to bring an action or to attack the actions of another
party were to be able arbitrarily to set himself up in the face of the facts as
speaking for myriads beyond himself who may have no desire whatever that he
speak for them, and I can not conceive that the granting of the right to bring
a representative action was ever intended to bestow such a right.125
Similarly in Markt, Fletcher Moulton, L.J., explained his reticence by
maintaining:
But that which to my mind most strikingly indicates the fundamental error of
the suggestion that the circumstances of these cases justify a representative action
is that I can conceive no excuse for allowing any one shipper to conduct litiga-
tion on behalf of another without his leave, and yet so as to bind him.126
The concern with due process is indicative of the fact that in Canada
anyone wishing to bring a class action can do so without the consent, or even
the knowledge of those whom he represents, and thereupon the judgment
in such case is final and binding upon everyone who comes within the class
description. 27 Unlike the suit against a defendant class, where the selection
of representatives is under the close supervision of the court, 28 the self ap-
pointed representative plaintiff is relatively free from such scrutiny and
control. 129 Though, in theory subject to the courts' inherent power to prevent
an abuse of process, his description of the class is generally not questioned,
unless put into issue by a defendant's motion to strike out the representa-
tion. 30 As a result, the right of the represented, but unnotified plaintiff, to
contest his inclusion within a class is entrusted strangely enough to the
defendant. Furthermore, the absence of close judicial supervision makes the
122 Supra, note 105.
12 3Supra, note 114. On its facts, the case is somewhat similar to Delong v. The
New Brunswick Teachers' Federation, supra, note 100 in that there were two clearly
delineated opposing factions within one group. In Judge v. Muslim Society of Toronto,
Inc., however, Holland, J., nowhere adverts to the question of common grievance.
124 Supra, note 101.
125 Supra, note 100 at 155.
126 Supra, note 75 at 1040 K.B. As to the binding effect of the representative claim
on other class members see Bamber v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [1943] 2 W.W.R. 529
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(Alta. C.A.); Watson v. Cave (1881), 17 Ch.D. 19; Commissioners of Sewers v.
Gellatly (1876), 3 Ch.D. 610; Barker v. Allanson, [1937] 1 K.B. 463 (C.A.). The very
notion of representation seems to indicate that all class members are, in effect, present,
and therefore bound by the decision. Problems however have arisen with discontinuance,
collusion and dissentient membership, but see text at note 131 infra and Holmestead
and Gale, 1973 Rules of Practice R. 75, ss. 7-9. In England, 0. 15, r. 12 (3) specifically
states that "A judgment or order given in proceedings under this Rule shall be binding
on all the persons as representing whom the plaintiffs sue or, as the case may be, the
defendants are sued, but shall not be enforced against any person not a party to the
proceedings except with the leave of the Court". Quare however, whether or not it is
ultra vires the English Rules Committee to pass on the binding effect of a judgment?
127 In Canada it is conceivable that barring judicial intervention, or the objections
of defendants, the rights of represented parties could be decided before the existence
of a res ever came to their attention. One wonders whether all the real estate salesmen
in Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 774 or
hydro users in Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1973), 32
D.L.R. (3d) 443, (class action against public utility for return of service security de-
posits, see infra, note 140), were ever aware of the actions brought on their behalf.
The problem has long confounded the American courts, for due process requirements
and the wording of F.R.C.P. 23 (c) (2) demand that notice be given to all class mem-
bers, yet often the costs are prohibitive. Under that rule a plaintiff must attempt to
give the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including actual written notice
to those who can be identified. The notified class member is then given an opportunity
to elect to have his name removed from the class and thereby be excluded from the
scope of the judgment. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
ss. 1786 to ss. 1788; Maraist and Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due
Process and the Class Action (1970), 49:1 Tex. L. Rev. 1 and cases cited therein.
128 Rule 75 states that ".... one or more.. . may be authorized by the court to
defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all." In Barrett v. Harris (1921), 51 O.L.R.
484, Middleton, J., remarked at 491: "I should add that an order authorising the
defendants to represent the class is, by the Rule, equally essential". The order is in the
discretion of the Master. See generally, Holmestead and Gale; 1972 Ontario Rules of
Practice R. 75, ss. 32 to 36.
129 A plaintiff class does not have to be "authorized" under R. 75, but recall how
the Court of Equity refused to proceed until it was assured that all parties were
present, either personally or through representation. A similar end was sought in May
v. Wheaton (1917), supra, note 10, where, in a case to determine the distribution of
an estate, Riddell, J., at trial gained the representation of the absent next of kin by
requesting the plaintiff to make an application to amend his claim to a representative
one. At 370 the Court recounts having stated: "I suppose, on application, I can make
the present plaintiff represent all those in the same interest, if that is asked; but I shall
not do so unless it is asked". The court here expresses its readiness to intervene and
ensure the presence of all interests through an amendment, yet note its reluctance to
act on its own motion, and the insistence that the plaintiff initiate the change. The
request was thereupon made and the defendants consented.
l50 This statement only pertains to the un-notified and absent class member who
may not find out until after judgment that his rights have been determined. On the
other hand, if the matter does come to the attention of a class member and he wishes
to be excluded from the scope of the decree, it appears that he could apply to be
removed from the class and be added as a named defendant (see text at notes 143-45
infra), and should he then choose, a motion could be brought to strike out the repre-
sentation. Doubts were expressed as to the fairness of this position however, by Ever-
shed, M.R., in Smith v. Cardiff Corporation, supra, note 97, where at 222 he con-
sidered the position of a class member who desires not to be bound, and who is
thereby compelled to request inclusion as a defendant: "It seems to me that such a
result involves a serious inroad upon the ordinary individual's liberty to make his own
terms with some other party with whom he is under no obligation to make any con-
tract at all, if he does not want to". Unlike the U.S. Federal class suit, there are no
notice and reply procedures permitting represented plaintiffs to fill out a form which
would remove them from the class without incurring legal expense (see note 127 supra).
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entire procedure susceptible to allegations of such unsavory ploys as de-
fendant inspired collusion or discontinuance.' 3 '
As a result of these potential encroachments upon fairness and due
process principles, the task of proper class definition assumes a role of para-
mount importance in the minds of the judiciary. On the one hand, they must
ensure that the scope of the class description is sufficiently narrow to avoid
the prejudicial effects of binding those whose interests are incapable of being
adequately advanced by the named representatives, 13 2 while on the other
hand, there must be enough definitional latitude to make certain that the very
purpose of the representation is not defeated. 33 It is in this context that the
common grievance notion can assume its crystallization function, for too
often the examination of constituent interests leads into an assessment of
minute detail, obscuring principle and ignoring Lord Macnaghten's instruc-
tion to focus not upon the individual differences between class members,
but upon those things which they have in common. 3 4 By considering the
elements of the dispute, one can more readily discern spheres of interest that
are sufficiently similar to satisfy the purpose of the rule and protect absent
party rights. The grievance formulation is no panacea, but it can in certain
instances, place the situation in such a perspective as to invite a glance at
the forest instead of the trees.'35
(iii) A Relief Beneficial to All
The third part of the same interest test requires that the relief sought
on behalf of the class should "in its nature be beneficial to all whom the
plaintiff proposes to represent,"' 3 6 and it is this formulation, more than the
grievance question which has currently attracted the attention of Canadian
courts. 13 7 While it is quite clear from such cases as DeLong v. The New
Brunswick Teachers' Federation38 that the scope of relief must encompass
all members of the class, it is not necessary that everyone benefit equally, for
as Grant, J., said in Drohan v. Sangamo Co. Ltd.:
That interest is more than merely a like or similar interest, and must be a
common interest in the sense that all persons represented will gain some relief
though possibly in different proportions and perhaps in different degrees:' 39
This qualification achieves its primary significance where a claim for
money is involved, for it would be virtually impossible to ever sue as a class
for such relief if each represented plaintiff was required to seek an identical
sum. In the above case, five retired employees of the defendant Sangamo
Co. Ltd. sued in a representative capacity for a declaration that a pension
plan agreement between the union and the company was still valid and bind-
131 In a great many situations, it would be extremely difficult for a court to inquire
into the possibility of whether or not a representative plaintiff was encouraged by the
defendant to compromise or discontinue a suit, for such tactics may take extremely
subtle forms. There are as well such second order prejudicial complaints as the named
plaintiff's retention of inexperienced or inept counsel, or his failure to press the case
with all due dispatch and diligence. Quare the possible scope of. tortious liability in-
curred by the representative in these situations? Once a suit is discontinued by the
representative, there remains the problem of substitution or replacement from among
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the represented multitude. The question is not without attendant complexity, and un-
fortunately there is an absence of modem Canadian authority. See however, Macdonald
v. Toronto (1897), 18 P.R. 17 (Ont. C.A.); Watson v. Cave (No. 1) (1881), 17 Ch.
D. 22; and generally 1973 Holmestead and Gale R. 75, ss. 7-10. The practice in England
has recently been clarified by Lord Denning in Moon v. Atherton, [1972] 3 All E.R.
145 (C.A.). At 146-47 he states: "In a representative action, the one person who is
named as plaintiff is, of course, a full party to the action. The others, who are not
named, but whom she represents are also parties to the action. They are all bound by
the eventual decision in the case. They are not full parties because they are not liable
individually for the costs. That was held by Eve, J., in Price v. Rhondda Urban District
Council (1923), 130 L.T. 156, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 679). But they are parties because
they are bound by the result. What then is to happen when the named plaintiff decides
to withdraw? It seems to me that then it is open to any one of those whom she repre-
sents to come forward and take the place of the named plaintiff". His Lordship at
147 continued: "This is necessary in order to do justice. If it were not so, the named
plaintiff might discontinue, or the defendant might settle with the named plaintiff, and
then leave the other unnamed plaintiffs out in the cold. It might be too late for them
to issue a new writ because of the statute of limitations. That cannot be right. It seems
to me that if, in a representative action, the named party falls out for any reason, the
court has ample power to substitute one of the unnamed parties as the plaintiff, and
to bring him in as at the date of the original writ".
132 The fundamental policy question is clearly and simply expressed by the editors
of the Harvard Law Review in the Note on the Ontario case of Barrett v. Harris at 36
Harv. L. Rev. 89 at 90 where they suggest: "The real question is, assuming that the
court has jurisdiction, considering all the circumstances, to what extent is it reasonable
to bind parties not actually before the court".
133 On the majority of occasions when representations have been struck out, the
plaintiffs have erred on the side of defining the class too broadly, but it is equally con-
sistent, though less likely, that a court would intervene to demand a more expansive
definition. For instance, in a situation involving the absence of necessary parties, an
Ontario court requested that an individual plaintiff amend his claim to a representative
one. See May v. Wheaton, supra, note 105. A more common cause of difficulty arises
not where the plaintiff clearly defines his class too broadly or narrowly, but where his
description is vague. See the opinion of Fletcher Moulton, C., in Markt (supra, note
75), where he states at 1034: "In the first place it is essential in the case of repre-
sentative actions that the class on behalf of which the relief is sought should be defined
in the writ. It is impossible for the Court to give any judgment as to the rights of
parties by virtue of their being members of a class without its being defined what con-
stitutes membership of the class. A mere list tells the Court nothing, more especially
when that list does not appear on the record".
134Bedford v. Ellis see text at note 115, supra.
135 One could regard R. 75 as pertaining not to one, but to several different cate-
gories of representative actions, for different considerations arise depending upon such
factors as the relief sought and whether or not the defendant comes from within the
class or is a stranger to it. The grievance formulation is here put forward as being best
suited to the explication of such broad disputes as arose in Bedford v. Ellis, supra, note
74, where large numbers challenge the conduct of someone outside their group. In
such cases, the trial of the majority's complaint must prevail over the possibility that
some of those coming within the class description might be of different minds.
138 Bedford v. Ellis, supra, note 74 at 8.
137 Text supra at notes 122-24.
38 Supra, note 100.
1 39 Supra, note 105 at 402. The language comes from the decision of Orde, J.A.,
in A.E. Osler & Co. v. Solman, [1926] 59 O.L.R. 368, where speaking of Preston v.
Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 (Wkly. Ct.) he uses much the same phrase. This inter-
pretation is quite easily reached when one considers that the phrase coined by Lord
Macnaghten in Bedford v. Ellis, and later adopted by the Court of Appeal in Markt,
and Smith v. Cardiff Corporation referred only to the "nature" of relief (see text
supra, at note 95).
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ing. They further sought a mandatory injunction requiring the payment of
retirement pensions which the plaintiffs alleged had not been paid to them
and damages for breach of contract. Mr. Justice Grant remarked that the
represented plaintiffs' interests might vary according to their individual en-
titlements which were dependent upon such criteria as length of service, age,
and other factors. Yet insofar as they would all benefit from a declaration
that the agreement was binding and in this respect had a common interest, he
refused to strike out the representation. Similarly, in Chastain v. British
Columbia Hydro and Power Authority'4" a group of ratepayers brought suit
against a public utility on behalf of themselves and all other power users
who had been required to pay, or had already paid security deposits to the
defendant. McIntyre, J., found the claim to be similar to Alden v. Gaglardi,'41
and not only granted a declaration that the defendant lacked valid authority
to retain such funds, but permanently enjoined it from "demanding, or col-
lecting, or keeping security deposits". 142 The amounts of the respective de-
posits had varied, yet that was a difference not in the nature of relief, but in
the degree, and so was not allowed to vitiate the commonality of interest. 43
The most obvious example of representations failing to accord with this
test occurs where the remedy sought not only fails to benefit, but is actually
detrimental to the interests of some class members. In such cases an amend-
ment may be allowed redefining the class and making those with inimical
interests defendants; or, the representation could be struck out and the named
plaintiff left to proceed alone.1 44 This latter course was followed in Smith v.
Cardiff Corporation where the plan of graduated rental increases based upon
ability to pay divided the alleged class of tenants, seeking to impeach it, for
as Evershed, M.R., said:
... the main characteristic of this scheme is that the more affluent wil, so to
say, subsidize the less affluent, it is at once apparent that there are two classes
whose interests are not only identical but are in conflict, namely, the subsidizers
and the subsidized.1 4 5
Success in attacking the plan would certainly have been injurious to the less
affluent class members, yet if the scheme was ultra vires, a means to impugn
it ought clearly to exist. The poorer tenants however could not be added as
defendants, for as Megarry, J., said of this aspect of the case, in John v. Rees,
the declaration and injunction sought against the Corporation would have
been "patently inappropriate remedies" to seek against the tenants. 46 The
named plaintiffs were thereupon permitted to continue but only in a personal
capacity. 147 There are also cases where the nature of the representative plain-
tiff's claims are purely "personal", and while not inimical to the interests of
absent class members, neither are they of benefit to them. 48 Such circum-
stances have assumed their greatest relevance in questions involving the avail-
ability of class damage actions and will therefore be considered in a later
section on Remedies. For present purposes, it is sufficient to realize that the
relief sought on behalf of a class must be in nature, though not in degree,
beneficial to everyone who comes within the class description.
Standing
Closely related to a consideration of class composition is the problem of
legal status or standing. 49 If a plaintiff in his own behalf does not have the
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proper capacity to sue, then it matters not how many others he purports to
represent, for he can not acquire any better standing by suing on behalf of
a class. For example, in Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,10
Schroeder, J.A., found that the plaintiff lacked the necessary locus standi to
declare invalid and enjoin the C.B.C.'s policy to transform Toronto radio
station C.J.B.C. to a wholly French language broadcaster. That status could
14o Supra, note 127.
141 Supra, note 101. The same result was reached in Shaw v. Real Estate Board of
Greater Vancouver, supra, note 127, where the return of different amounts by way of
real estate commissions were claimed and the B.C. Supreme Court allowed the action
to proceed as a representative one.
142 Supra, note 127 at 449.
143 It should be noted however, that the representative issue did not appear to be
strongly contested by the defendant for McIntyre, J., remarked that the defendant did
not object strenuously to the form of action and that in fact, "little authority was re-
ferred to" in this part of the case.
144 It is important to place in perspective the range of possible dispositions of a
defendant's motion to strike out. One must keep in mind that only an interlocutory
question of procedure is being entertained, quite apart from any determination upon
the actual merits of the case. The first possible disposition would be to deny the
motion and let the action proceed to be heard as a representative claim. Secondly, the
court might allow the motion and delete the representation, with the named plaintiff
thereby left in control only of his own destinies. On this point, reference should be had
to Stoljar, The Representative Action: The Modern Position (1957) supra, note 97 for
comments on the relatively little difference between class and single suits in a great
many situations. For a recent Canadian view to the opposite effect, see the Note on
Alden v. Gaglardi in Bulletin of Canadian Welfare Law 1973, Vol. 2, No. 1. There
is also a possibility that the plaintiff would be permitted to amend a defective class
description and apply to add the excluded members as defendants. The authority for
this proposition can be traced to Chancery, and to a line of English cases immediately
following codification. (Wilson v. Church (1878), 9 Ch.D. 552; Watson v. Cave (1881),
17 Ch.D. 19; Fraser v. Cooper, Hall & Co. (1882) 21 Ch.D. 718). Recently, Megarry,
J., went even further in John v. Rees, supra, note 77 and stated at 283: "But if the
named parties to the action together put forward every view that is seriously advanced,
I cannot see that any real harm is done to a person whose part in the action is merely
that he is represented by the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is supporting a different
cause, provided that there is a defendant who does stand for the cause espoused by the
person being represented: actions are decided by reference to justice according to law,
and not by counting heads." A fourth possible disposition involves the dismissal of
the suit and arises when the defendant's motion to strike out the representation is
joined as an alternative claim to a motion to set aside the pleadings as disclosing no
reasonable cause of action (see Farnham v. Fingold, infra, note 176). There is how-
ever judicial antipathy towards the disposition of a suit before it can be heard on its
merits, and perhaps the best time for an assessment of the propriety of a class claim
might be at trial as in Judge v. Muslim Society of Toronto Inc. discussed supra, at
note 114.
145 Supra, note 97 at 221-22.
140 John v. Rees, supra, note 77 at 286.
147 [1955] 1 All E.R. 113. Resolved in favour of defendant Cardiff Corporation.
148 See the quotation from Markt in note 85, supra.
149 Recall Lord Eldon's concern in Chancery (supra, note 37) that a group of
persons without any legal standing qua group should be allowed to treat themselves as
if they had such status. For an interesting American comment on the standing ques-
tion, see Louis L. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 633.
150 [1966] 2 O.R. 309 (C.A.).
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only have been acquired had Mr. Cowan incurred special damage or demon-
strated an interest beyond that of the general public. When leave was sought
to amend the action to a representative one on behalf of "all other English
speaking taxpayers of Metropolitan Toronto who habitually listened to
broadcasting station C.J.B.C. in the English Language," the court refused:
The only persons who would be identified in interest with the plaintiff would
be individual members of the public who desired the same relief as he is seek-
ing. If the plaintiff has no right as an individual to bring and maintain an action
to redress an alleged public wrong, then his claim as a representative of other
individuals, however numerous, who have no higher rights than he possesses
cannot enhance his position.' 51
Only the Attorney General could sue to enforce such broad public rights,
unless of course, some members of the public were able to demonstrate a
peculiar or special injurious affection.152 In Bedford v. Ellis,153 Alden v.
Gaglardi5 4 and Chastain v. British Columbia Power and Hydro Authority, 55
public rights were enforced by the class device because the plaintiffs and
the class which they represented possessed the requisite interest of having
suffered damages beyond that of the public at large. As the plaintiffs con-
tended in Chastain, they had, in a sense, been selected from the general pub-
lic by the acts of the defendant.' 56 In such cases the special interest which
gives the plaintiffs standing also provides the necessary unifying interest for
class composition purposes.
Given the increasing attention which the class action has received as a
161 Id., at 315.
152 In theory, the public interest is vested in the Crown, and the Attorney General
has for centuries been considered the custodian of that interest. Smith v. A. G. Ontario,
[1924] S.C.R. 331; Grant v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, [1960] O.R. 298; Burnham
v. A. G. Canada (1970), 74 W.W.R. 427 (B.C. Sup. Ct. Chambers). In Boyce v.
Paddington Borough Council, [1903] 1 Ch. 109, Buckley, J., at 114 mentioned two
occasions when an individual could sue to enforce a public right without the Attorney
General: "first, where the interference with the public right is such as that some private
right of his is at the same time interfered with (e.g. where an obstruction is so placed
in a highway that the owner of premises abutting upon the highway is specially affected
by reason that the obstruction interferes with his private right to access from and to
his premises to and from the highway), and, secondly, where no private right is inter-
fered with, but the plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special damage
peculiar to himself from the interference with the public right".
153 Supra, note 74. The Court of Appeal at [1899] 1 Ch. 494 had insisted upon
the addition of the Attorney General, but as Lord Macnaghten stated at [1901] A.C. 12
"From that part of the order there is no appeal. Speaking, however, for myself, I can-
not see what the Attorney General has to do with the matter. The plaintiffs do not
want him; still less does the defendant". His Lordship thought this to be a strictly
private matter which did not affect public rights.
154 Supra, note 101.
'15 Supra, note 127.
156 Id., at 447.
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potential vehicle for the enforcement of broad public rights,157 the most sig-
nificant standing questions of the coming decade might well involve the
desirability of giving self appointed representatives the right to invest them-
selves with the status of public defender.158
Remedies
It is one thing to quite liberally construe the phrase "same interest" in
order that larger numbers might be afforded a convenient and efficient means
of airing their grievances, but it is quite another matter to invest those group
members with the full panoply of remedies otherwise available to individual
litigants. During the initial two hundred years of class suit development, the
only available remedies were, of course, equitable ones, such as declarations,
injunctions, and bills to account but not damages, which could only be sought
in actions at law. Consequently, when the Judicature Act of 1873 brought
about the merger of the two Courts and a codification of the class action,
it was left to the judiciary to determine the remedies which would be made
available to class plaintiffs. Today, one hundred years after the passing of
that Act, the utilization of representative procedures in actions for other
than equitable relief has been infrequent, and although that situation has been
modified somewhat in the last year or two, one should consider the present
situation as it relates to equitable claims before proceeding on to the more
contentious issue of legal remedies or damages.
(i) Equity
A declaratory judgment is simply a judicial pronouncement on the
157 The problem of the plaintiffs status also affects strictly private right class
actions and claims will be disallowed where the plaintiff doesn't have the personal
status to sue. See Dillon v. Township of Raleigh (1886), 13 O.A.1. 53; Rochford v.
Brown (1912), 25 O.L.R. 206 (Div. Ct.); Harris Maxwell Larder Lake Mining Co. v.
Gold Fields Ltd. (1911), 23 O.L.R. 625 (1-.C.). Quare whether the powers of sub-
stitution as set out in Moon v. Atherton, supra, note 131 would have any effect upon
this position?
158 In the United States, the class action has become the adopted child of the con-
sumer and environmental movements, and has attracted a great deal of attention in
American legal publications. For example, see R.F. Dole, Jr., Consumer Class Actions
under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation (1969), 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 80; E.O. Kegan,
Consumer Class Suits - Righting the Wrongs to Consumers (1971), 26 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 130. The Chastain and Alden cases in B.C., and the recent increases in re-
ported class claims in Ontario are perhaps reflective of the influence of the American
experience, but one must carefully consider whether the private enforcement of public
rights on so broad a scale is properly within the texture of Canadian legal traditions.
For a Canadian proponent of the above approach in the consumer field see MJ. Trebil-
cock, Private Law Remedies for Misleading Advertising (1972), 22 U. of T. LJ. 1,
and the U.S. literature cited therein. In the area of welfare law, regard should be had
to the comment on Alden v. Gaglardi referred to supra, at note 144. As for environ-
mental concerns, see J.P.S. McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the
Environmental Battle - Well Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds (1972), 10 Osgoode
Hall Law Journal 505 and W. Estey, Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue (1972), 10
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 563.
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parties' respective rights and liabilities.159 Consequently, it doesn't entail any
immediate interference with personal freedoms, for unlike the injunction and
the damage award, the declaration can not be used to directly restrain con-
duct or to redistribute property and money. As such, it is the least con-
tentious of all class remedies, and the one most frequently sanctioned by thejudiciary. In Bainber v. Bank of Nova Scotia, Ford, J.A., of the Alberta
Court of Appeal went so far as to maintain that a class suit "is peculiarly
applicable to cases where a declaration of a right common to the plaintiff
and those represented is sought." 160 Unfortunately, this popularity quite often
occurs when it is needed least, for in a majority of the situations where
class plaintiffs obtained declaratory relief, it was clear that the same results
could have been achieved had the individual representative chosen, instead,
to sue only in his personal capacity, and not on behalf of a class. For in-
stance, in Alden v. Gaglardi'0 ' the plaintiff sought to call into question a
policy of the provincial government which denied social assistance to those
unemployed as a result of a strike or lockout. Had Mr. Alden not elected
to bring a representative action, the Court's final decision technically would
not have bound everyone who might have been injuriously affected by the
policy, but in practice, his success would clearly have been as beneficial to
them as if they had been a part of his class. By instituting a representative
action, he bound all others to his losing cause and exhausted the rights of
the other class members to raise the same issue in their own behalf. The
benefits of such actions, beyond their publicity value, are indeed dubious,
although some have contended that they ensure the airing of important social
issues which would otherwise have been lost to abandonment by a plaintiff
whose situation subsequently became so changed as to disentitle him from
the carriage of the suit.10 2
The injunction is a remedy which has been used in representative suits
since their inception. There is some difficulty with its use against defendant
159 At one time it was necessary to join a claim for consequential relief with one
for a declaratory judgment but according to s. 18(2) of the Judicature Act, R.S.O.
1970 c. 228 this is no longer necessary:
18(2) No action or proceeding is open to objection on the ground that a merely
declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the court may make
binding declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief is
or could be claimed.
The remedy is discretionary and courts display a certain reticence in exercising
that discretion in a manner which might result in a declaration being made in a
vacuum, and in practice, the claim is rarely left to stand on its own. Recall the dis-
cussion on the sufficiency of a declaration of liability in a damage action and the
controversy between the majority opinion and the dissent of Buckley, LJ., in Markt
set out supra, note 82 to 88.
100 Supra, note 126 at 537.
10 1 Supra, note 101.
10 2 See the Comment on Alden v. Gaglardi in Bulletin of Canadian Welfare Law
referred to supra, note 144. The editors there state that Mr. Alden had returned to
work by the time the suit was heard and had it not been for the representation, the
case would have become "moot" and therefore not heard. Reference should here be
made to that part of the work dealing with the substitution of representatives at note
131 supra.
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classes, 10 for an individually uncontested restraint upon conduct might con-
stitute too obvious an encroachment upon principles of due process. Yet,
insofar as plaintiff classes are concerned, the situation is relatively straight-
forward. Given proper class composition and standing the injunction will
only be denied where the nature of the claim is in some way "personal" to
each respective class member, as in the case of many landowners attempting
to collectively enjoin a private nuisance.164 Just as with the declaration, how-
ever, there is a certain air of multiplicity to a great many of the injunctive
class suits, for the remedy is no more effective in most instances if it is ob-
tained by one or one hundred. Curiously enough, it is at those times when
the need for the remedy is not redundant, and where each class member's
interest must be protected that one becomes embroiled in the problem of
the relief being so "personal" as to vitiate the commonality of interest which
had identified the class.
According to the rather peculiar wording of the trial judgment in
Chastain v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority,165 it appears conceivable that
a new use for the injunction may have been found - namely in matters con-
cerning the distribution of money. In the words of McIntyre, J., a permanent
injunction was issued "restraining the Defendant, its servants, agents, repre-
sentatives and persons acting on its behalf from demanding, or collecting, or
keeping security deposits as a condition precedent to the supply of gas or
electrical power to residential consumers, or as a condition to the continua-
tion of the supply of gas and electrical power to any of the Plaintiffs or any
member of the class represented in this action."'166 The use of the injunction
to restrain someone from "keeping" money is indeed unconventional, if not
irregular, and perhaps might be open to criticism for unduly subjecting the
Defendant to the peril of contempt proceedings for non-compliance with the
order. In any event, at the time of writing, the judgment stood as an interest-
ing use of the injunctive power in class actions, though one which clearly
required further analysis.
A more tested and customary method of equitable monetary distribution
can be found in the action for an accounting, which essentially requires that
an assessment be made of the respective debits and credits considered by
16 See generally, D.J. Sherbaniuk, Actions By and Against Trade Unions in
Contract and Tort, supra, note 2.
164 In Preston v. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 (Ont. Wkly. Ct.), where home-
owners sued as a class to, inter alia, enjoin the nuisance caused by a local horse stable
and waggon shed. Orde, J., refused their claim on the grounds that each person had a
separate and distinct cause of action peculiar to himself. It was only by reason of
special injury that the individual plaintiff had status to sue at all. Contrast this to the
position on standing taken by McIntyre, I., in Chastain v. British Columbia Hydro and
Power Authority, text, supra, notes 154-57.
165 Supra, note 127.
166 Id., at 447.
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the parties to be owing one to the other.1 7 Common examples would include
a principal seeking an account of his agent's secret profits or the members of
a partnership accounting to each other upon dissolution. Recently, plaintiff
classes have resorted to this remedy in situations where it would otherwise
have been neither customary nor appropriate. The reason for this may be
attributable to the traditionally restrictive approach taken towards class
damage claims, which in turn has placed pressures on representative claimants
to regard the accounting as an alternate method for the recovery of money.
The advocates of this position rely most heavily upon the fact that repre-
sentative actions for accountings were allowed in Equity, but fail to con-
ceptually appreciate the reasons why.16 In so doing they commit the same
error as those who strictly adhere to the dicta of Markt in professing all class
damage awards to be per se bad. Both fail to adequately consider the con-
textual balancing of due process principles with convenience and the binding
scope of the judgment. In Chastain, for example, the plaintiff's claim for an
account and return of service security deposits was indirectly permitted
through the peculiar use of the injunction referred to earlier, 69 while on
remarkably similar facts an action by Ontario gas users to recoup a rate over-
payment was disallowed because of the "personal" character of the class
members' respective interests.170 Given the billing and recording systems of
public utilities and the readily determinable amounts involved, little admin-
istrative difficulty would have arisen in directing repayment to the consumers
in both cases, nor does it appear that the rights of absent class mem-
bers likely would have suffered any substantial detriment. In theory, such
circumstances would seem well suited to a class money claim, yet in the
Ontario case, the appropriate form of relief was directly sought and refused.
The injunction qua account in Chastain was indirect, if not inappropriate,
but succeeded. In a similar vein, consider the following case. Matters of
agency have customarily fallen within the realm of accounting actions, and
one of the most striking examples of the remedy in this context can be seen
in Shaw v. Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver17 1 where Andrews, J.,
granted the plaintiff real estate salesmen leave to amend their action for an
accounting to one on behalf of "all other persons who, from the date of
inception of the Multiple Listing Service of the'Defendant to the date
of the issue of the Writ herein, were salesmen with a right to commission
on one or more contracts of sale upon which an assessment was paid to the
Defendant by their employer under the rules of the Defendant relating to its
167 The action for account developed both at Law and in Equity, but eventually
the jurisdiction of Chancery prevailed. Traditionally these actions were heard on
reference to the Master and not in Court. Care however, should be taken not to con-
fuse this remedy with the claim at Law of money had and received, which the English
C.A., in Hardie & Lane Ltd. v. Chiltern, [1928] 1 K.B. 663, considered to fall within
the "personal" qualification of Markt.
108 Recall discussion in text supra, notes 65-72.
1609 Supra, note 165.
170 Johnston v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1896), 23 O.A.R. 566. See also Shields v.
Mayor (1953] O.W.N. 5 (C.A.), where an action for the return of rental overpayments
on behalf of a group of apartment tenants was not allowed.
171 Supra, note 93.
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Multiple Listing Service". 172 The plaintiffs claimed that the Service was
ultra vires the powers of the Greater Vancouver Real Estate Board and
therefore requested the assessment and return of that portion of their com-
missions which had been submitted by the agents for the maintenance of the
Service. Unlike Chastain, the form of relief which the plaintiffs had chosen
in this case was traditionally appropriate. Nevertheless, the administrative
difficulty and potential prejudice likely to be encountered in the assessment
and return of contributions to so fluctuating a class which Andrews, J., de-
scribed as "one of the largest groups of persons ever to be represented,"' 7 3
can only present serious questions concerning the soundness and practicality
of the decision. If the propriety of a class suit is made at all dependent upon
the formalities of remedy selection, then the distortions of Shaw and Chastain
are likely to result. In practical terms all class actions which involve the
distribution of money, whether titled as actions for accounts, or for damages
present essentially similar conceptual issues and should therefore in so far as
possible be accorded a uniform treatment.
(ii) Damages
Apart from a general reluctance to supervise potentially complicated
monetary distributions, the reason why Anglo-Canadian Courts have, until
now, rejected class actions for damages 174 can be found in Fletcher Moulton
L.J.'s succinct and oft repeated passage in Markt where His Lordship at-
tempted to tie the issue of remedy selection into the requirements of class
composition:
Damages are personal only. To my mind no representative action can lie where
the sole relief sought is damages, because they have to be proved separately
in the case of each plaintiff, and therefore the possibility of representation
ceases.175
This now classic position is premised upon the theory that in computing
damages each man's compensible loss is unique to himself and therefore the
interests of potential class members are not sufficiently similar to warrant
172 1d., at 774. The Multiple Listing Service referred to in the amended style of
cause is an arrangement whereby real estate agents pool the listings of houses for sale,
and thereby make each property available to all prospective purchasers and their
agents in a given area.
173 Id., at 777.
374 On the question of damages in class suits see D.J. Sherbaniuk, Actions By
and Against Trade Unions in Contract and Tort, supra, note 2 at 161-88; Keeler,
Contractual Actions for Damages Against Unincorporated Bodies (1971), 34 Mod.
L. Rev. 615. In the United States, the damage claim has been advanced well beyond
the Canadian position, though one must not overlook the difference between the word-
ing of American F.R.C.P. 23 supra and R. 75. For an explanation of how the damage
suit is handled in that country and of some problems which are still encountered see
F.L. Maraist and T. Page Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process
and the Class Action (1970), 49 Tex. L. Rev. 1; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil ss. 1765-1784; and M.J. Trebilcock, supra, note 158. The
Australian courts have recently considered the problem in a series of cases dealing
with the status of various cricket clubs to sue in a representative capacity. See Banfield
v. Wells-Eicke, [1970] V.R. 481; and Carlton Cricket & Football Social Club v.
Joseph, [1970] V.R. 487 (Vict. S.C.).
17 5 Supra, note 75 at 1040.
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representation. In the sixty years since Markt, few significant departures have
been made from the above position. Moreover, very little consideration has
ever been given to the rationale behind the damage proscription, for as
Jessup, l.A., recently commented in Farnham v. Fingold,'76 "subsequent
authorities and authors who have stated such a rule as the law have simply
quoted Fletcher Moulton, L.J.' u77 There have been isolated occasions where
Canadian courts expressed reservations about Markt - for example, in
Bowen v. Macmillan,78 Ferguson, J., was reported as being unable to say,
without doubt, that Rule 75 was not applicable in any action for damages.
Of more recent note is Drohan v. Sangamo Co. Ltd.,179 where a class of fac-
tory workers sought a declaration, an injunction and damages in a labour
dispute over the defendant company's performance of a pension agreement.
The defendant's motion to strike out the representation was founded inter alia
on the alleged impropriety of bringing so personal a suit as one for con-
tractual damages, but Grant, J., denied the motion without passing judgment
on the broader question of whether that form of relief was available to class
plaintiffs at all. He reasoned that in such instances the defendant's proper
course was to strike, not at the representation, but at those parts of the claim
dealing with damages, for otherwise the plaintiffs would be prevented from
pursuing other relief to which they were entitled. The significant factor here,
is that the court treated the question of damages not as an element vitiating
proper class composition as in Markt, but more as a wholly separate and
additional subsection appended to Rule 75. Once detached in this way from
its conceptual basis in "personalness", the damage proscription becomes sus-
ceptible to erosion from argument based upon practicality and expedience.
A yet more significant assault on Markt was delivered this year by the
Ontario Court of Appeal. In Farnham v. Fingold, 0 the plaintiff class of
minority shareholders sought twenty-five million dollars in damages as well
as an injunction, a declaration and an accounting against various defendants
who were at one time or another either majority shareholders, directors or
brokers of Slater Steel Industries Ltd. The cause of action allegedly arose
because the defendants failed to inform the plaintiffs of a third party's offer
to purchase the Company at share value plus premium and also because of
other conduct of the defendants leading up to the eventual sale. The de-
fendants met with success in their appeal to set aside the decision of Morand,
J., who had denied their motion to strike out the statement of claim, but
17 0 Supra, note 102.
177 d., at 136. Jessup, J.A., went on to distinguish the statement as mere dicta,
properly maintaining that "Vaughan Williams, L.J, did not make such a rule any
part of the ratio of his judgment", nor did Buckley, L.J., who dissented.
178 (1921-22), 21 O.W.N. 23. The case involved a class action for both special
and general damages arising out of a labour dispute between two rival unions. Fergu-
son, J., directed the action to proceed to trial, by denying the defendant's motion to
strike out the representative paragraphs of the statement of claim. The case has re-
ceived remarkably little affirmative judicial consideration. Of comparable repute is the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in Smart v. Livett, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 47 where
a class damage action was actually permitted in a labour case on grounds that the
Markt damage proscription was drawn too widely.
170 Supra, note 105.
180 Supra, note 102.
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Class Actions
Jessup, J.A., granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended class damage
claim. In his reasons, the learned appeal judge accorded recognition to a
distinction between different types of damage actions and maintained:
Thus, where the members of a class have damages that must be separately as-
sessed, it would be unjust to permit them to be claimed in a class action because
the defendant would be deprived of individual discoveries, and, in the event
of success, would have recourse for costs only against the named plaintiff al-
though his costs were increased by multiple separate claims. However, in the
present case it is clear from both the respondent's argument and factum, although
not from the pleading, that the only damages alleged by the plaintiff to have
been sustained by the class he represents, including damage for conspiracy, is the
gross premium above market price received by the controlling shareholders on
the sale of their shares to Stanton Pipes Limited and that the individual entitle-
ment of members of the class is simply to a pro rata share of such gross
premium.' 8 '
The decision presents the most liberal interpretation of the damage proscrip-
tion to date, and is a continuation of the practical approach begun in Drohan
v. Sangamo.1s2 As the most recent statement on the status of class actions
for damages in Ontario, Farnham v. Fingold should serve to eliminate some
of the distortion imposed upon class suits for accounts and may facilitate
representative actions for money had and received and damages where the
claim is for a liquidated sum. One can, however, anticipate a degree of
difficulty in the application of the distinction which the Court makes between
1811d., at 136-37. One might do well to carefully consider the prejudicial aspects
of the class suit as it relates not only to absent class members but to defendants as
well. Jessup, J.A. raises the issue of the defendant losing the right to separate dis-
coveries and of being inflicted with unrecoverable costs. Depending on circumstance the
first point might be well taken, but as for the second, it appears to overlook the effect
of the security for costs provisions of Rule 373(h). The defendants costs are roughly
the expenses he undergoes in defending the action and if those are much greater in
the case of the defence of a class suit the representative plaintiff ought to be liable to
that extent. If he is merely a "straw man", who is put forward by others and is pos-
sessed of insufficient property to meet potential costs, the defendant may move for
security for costs under the above rule. Another possible objection a defendant might
have to a class claim is that it deprives him of his right to establish separate defences
against certain members of the class as Fletcher Moulton mentioned in Markt. Gen-
erally one would expect that where there were separate defences, the necessary uni-
formity of interest would not be found and the class suit not permitted at all, but it
is possible to conceive of situations where a separate defence pertaining to a large
percentage of the class could be heard in the main action without too much difficulty.
A common fear of defendants in the United States is that the class suit for damages
can be used as pressure for settlement because the downside risk in contesting a multi-
million dollar damage claim is too high. Yet contrasted against this is Lord Shand's
statement in Bedford v. Ellis to the effect that defendants should be relieved to find
all their eggs in one basket. On one hand it appears terribly wasteful and inefficient to
have the same set of facts litigated and relitigated, and clearly if the defendant's
concern was with costs, he would attempt to avoid multiple single suits. On the other
hand, many defendants are often fully aware of the percentage of aggrieved potential
class members who would never litigate if left to their own initiative.
A complete and proper discussion of the role of costs in class actions cannot be
adequately dealt with in a work of the present size. Yet in passing, one should point
out the fact that in most Canadian provinces fees cannot be charged on a contingency
basis. As a result, the downside risk factor is much different in this country and the
thought of massive damage recoveries presents little added encouragement to either
plaintiffs or their solicitors.
182 Supra, note 105.
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separately and collectively assessed damage claims. The lines of division be-
tween the two categories appear to be shrouded in obscurity and unfortunately
the Court of Appeal was able to offer very little by way of guideline or ex-
ample to ameliorate the situation. For example, it remains to be seen how
such contentious claims as those arising from a standard form contract will
be handled.
As for unliquidated sums, it is fair to say that although the assessment
of quanta can be referred to the Master once liability is established. Canadian
courts are historically untried and procedurally ill-equipped at present to
administer class damage claims. If the American experience is any example,
class actions for damages are in their very nature likely to be exceedingly
lengthy and complicated. Ontario Rule 75 neither contains any provision for
the notification of absent class members, nor does it make any allowance for
the disposition of the unclaimed residues of a class damage pool. Conse-
quently until such time as the present rules are amended it is indeed essential
that Canadian courts pay heed to the reasons behind the damage proscrip-
tion, and proceed with reflection and caution in the future consideration of
such matters. 183
CONCLUSION
The nature of law must be regarded, not merely as a collection of sub-
stantive rights and obligations, but as a coherent set of procedures - as a
process, designed for the resolution of foreseeable conflict and the orderly
progression of affairs. When law is seen in this light, we are more apt to
discern and formulate a coherence in both purpose and long term policy. In
this respect one would view the modem corporate form, not merely as a
substantive creature, but as a procedural vehicle or institutionalized process
for large groups of people to engage in various kinds of economic behaviour.
As far as the legal affairs of such groups were concerned, before the out-
growth of modem company legislation they were forced to rely, not upon a
corporate personality, but upon Equity's procedures for class representation.
Until labour unions were statutorily invested with some degree of legal per-
sonality, the procedure for groups of workers wishing to unite in the en-
forcement of their legal rights was, and to some extent still is, the class
action. The process of statutorily according recognition to the holders of cer-
tain communal interests continues in every mature legal system, leaving the
representative action to repeatedly encounter the nascent or the unique in-
terest grouping. Because of the many and varied situations in which repre-
sentation can arise, it is necessary that the wording and application of the
rules governing its use remain flexible and related to conceptual purpose and
policy. To this end courts must strive to follow the lessons of Equity and
attempt in each case to reconcile due process principles with the dictates of
convenience and efficiency.
183 One can but proffer words of caution to those who advocate the borrowing of
various aspects of American procedures. There are substantial differences between the
two procedural systems both in their more immediate heritage and in their approach
to basic problems, and without long and in depth study, the American influence should
not be readily inserted into the applications of Rule 75.
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